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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of the health decentralization of funds and responsibilities that
took place in Mexico in 1997 on state level health outcomes. It renders two main results.
First, the magnitude of transfers from the federal government to states failed to take into
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Resumen
Este documento estudia el impacto de la descentralizaci on de los fondos y responsabilidades
en materia de salud que se llev o a cabo en M exico en 1997 sobre medidas de bienestar
en salud a nivel estatal. Obtenemos dos resultados principales. Primero, la magnitud de las
transferencias del gobierno federal a los estados no tom o en cuenta las necesidades espec cas
de salud de cada uno de los estados; en cambio, las transferencias estuvieron principalmente
determinadas por el gasto en salud que el gobierno federal ejecutaba en cada estado previo
a la reforma. Segundo, la descentralizaci on no mejor o los avances en salud logrados durante
el r egimen centralizado de salud. Concluimos discutiendo las posibles razones por las que se
explica el decepcionante impacto de la descentralizaci on sobre las medidas de bienestar en
salud.
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I. Introduction 
Fiscal decentralization has been part of the reform agenda in many developing 
countries for the last two decades. Theoretically, state and local fiscal autonomy is 
founded on the idea that public policy decisions by lower tiers of governments would 
bring about more efficient outcomes in the provision of public goods (Oates, 1972). It is 
argued that sub-national governments are better able to identify the needs and 
preferences of citizens. Under fiscal decentralization taxpayers are closer to authorities, 
allowing them to demand transparency, accountability, and efficiency in the use of 
public resources. As a result, decentralization is expected to generate economic growth 
and improvements in the welfare of the population.
1 Having these positive effects in 
mind, Mexico undertook a profound reform in the 1990s to modify the expenditure 
responsibilities of the Federation and state governments. The main aim of the reform 
was to transfer financial resources and responsibilities to state and local governments 
for the provision of specific public goods. By 1998, five earmarked funds were created 
(for basic education, health services, social infrastructure, municipal strengthening, and 
a multiple destination fund);
2 these were financed through federal transfers to sub-
national governments.
3  
This paper focuses on one of these earmarked funds: the Health Services Fund
4 
(FASSA, for its acronym in Spanish). Particularly, we analyze the consequences that such 
fund had over the health of the population according to specific health outcomes. We 
present results for infant mortality rate at the state level,  a broadly used health 
indicator; but our results are robust to the use of other health indicators. With the 
                                                        
1  However, fiscal federalism outcomes may be the opposite if political economy considerations are 
included in the analysis (Proudhome, 2004 and Weingast, 2009). 
2 In 1999 two more funds were added: for public safety and for technological and adult education.  
3 It is important to address that the reform focused on changing the expenditures assignments between 
states and federation but it did not modify tax collection responsibilities among tiers of governments. 
Federal government is still responsible for collecting more than 90 per cent of the public revenue of the 
country, but after unconditional and the earmarked federal transfers, sub-national governments spend 
around 50 per cent of the public expenditure in Mexico.   
4In Spanish, Fondo de Aportaciones para Servicios de Salud (FASSA). 2 
 
reform, states were in charge of organizing, controlling, coordinating, evaluating and 
monitoring the provision of health services and facilities; medical attention; maternity 
care; visual and hearing health; nutrition; epidemiology; among others for non-insured 
population.
 5 In this context, FASSA’s aim was to endow states with resources to meet 
their new health responsibilities that came with the decentralization of the sector. 
Decentralization meant that the medical attention of the non-insured (and therefore 
more vulnerable) population would now become the responsibility of state health 
authorities. Also, states were responsible for the administration of state hospitals for 
primary health care that used to be operated by the federal Ministry of Health (MofH 
hereafter) before the reform. One particular feature of the decentralization reform is 
that during the first years of the reform, states received an amount of economic 
resources from FASSA similar to what the federal MofH spent previous to the reform in 
each state. Another interesting feature is that the allocation of FASSA among states did 
not respond to particular health needs of states. These two facts, besides being clearly 
surprising, allow us to identify the impact on health indicators when health budget is 
spent by state governments rather than by the federal one. 
We explore whether the decentralization of health provision can explain part of 
the improvements in state level health indicators that Mexico has experienced in the 
last twenty years. First, we discuss whether the institutional arrangement of health 
decentralization is appropriate to maximize the impact of each peso spent. For instance, 
the Law of Fiscal Coordination states a formula that specifies the factors used to 
calculate the share of the FASSA assigned to each state, but does not present the 
weights given to each factor. Even more importantly, the factors determining what 
every state receives do not include health needs or rewards to those states that are 
spending efficiently. In order to address this issue, we present some estimations that 
analyze the determinants of FASSA. Surprisingly, we find that the money spent by the 
federal government in each state in 1997, that is, the year before the reform was 
                                                        
5  The  non-insured is the fraction of the population that is not covered by an insurance mechanism; 
however they can access health care services at less than full-cost prices in Ministry of Health and state 
health facilities (OECD, 2005, pp. 29 and 30). 3 
 
implemented, is the strongest predictor of what each state receives from the FASSA in 
any given year. We also found that health outcome variables, like infant mortality rate 
and deaths by infectious and parasitic diseases, do not show steady or significant 
coefficients. Medical resources are, in general, statistically insignificant, contrary to 
what the formula of FASSA stipulates. Population is the variable that more consistently 
shows a negative sign. We also perform similar regressions to look at the determinants 
of the non-insured health expenditure made by the federal government (Ramo 12) 
before the reform. The results are very similar to the FASSA regressions and we 
conclude that the most important determinant driving health expenditure is the 
expenditure made in prior to decentralization.  
The second part of our empirical strategy studies whether transferring resources 
from the federal government to states, as it happened with the decentralization process 
of 1997, has an effect on the infant mortality rate. For this purpose we rely on different 
empirical exercises. We first compare FASSA to Ramo 12 (the federal budget on health) 
by estimating the effect each budget had over infant mortality rate for the years after 
the reform and for the years before the reform, respectively. This allows us to make a 
comparison between how state governments performed between 1998 and 2003 
relative to how the federal government did between 1993 and 1997. The former 
exercise is an important comparison because the decentralization reform consisted in 
transfers of resources and responsibilities from the federal to state governments. We 
found no significant difference in the efficiency of Ramo 12 and FASSA. Perhaps one 
reason we did not find a significant effect is that some states did very well whereas 
others underperformed, washing out gains when averaging across states. Thus, in our 
second set of estimates, we test whether states that received more FASSA resources 
observed better health outcomes than low FASSA states when comparing the years 
after the reform with the years before the reform. Again, we found no significant 
difference between the high FASSA group relative to the low FASSA group. In another 4 
 
set of estimations, we find that the fetal death
6 rate among the non-insured population 
did not have a significant change after 1997 when compared to the fetal death rate in 
the insured population. However, for the fetal death rate, if we compare the 
expenditure efficiency (as measured by the effect of health expenditure increases on 
the infant mortality rate) of both FASSA and Ramo 12 with that of health expenditure 
for the insured population, we found that the former became more efficient after the 
decentralization reform. In conclusion, except for the last specification, the evidence 
suggests that the decentralization of the health sector did not have an effect on the 
well-being of the population.  
The contribution of this paper is multifold. The first two are empirical ones. In 
the first place, this is the first work that evaluates empirically the effects of 
decentralizing the health sector in Mexico as well as the determinants of the 
distribution of health funds across states. Second, to the best of our knowledge, this 
paper is the only one that compares the efficiency in the provision of health services 
between the federal and state governments in two different federalist settings: 
centralized and decentralized. The second two contributions are related to the 
methodology. First, our identification strategy allows us to overcome some problems of 
endogeneity between decentralization and health outcomes, an issue seldom discussed 
in the literature. Finally, our measure of health decentralization is the actual health 
expenditure made by the state governments (from federal transfers), which, we 
consider, is a cleaner way to analyze efficiency issues relative to previous literature.  
The results of the present work may give important lessons about the conditions 
under which fiscal decentralization maximizes its impact on people´s welfare. We argue 
that successful decentralization may be related to some necessary conditions: revenue 
collection decentralization, the strengthening of transparency and accountability of 
state governments, and improving institutional checks and balances.  
                                                        
6 In this case, we did not use the infant mortality rate because it is not possible to distinguish between 
non-insured and insured population. Due to the way fetal deaths are registered, it is possible to construct 
a fetal death rate for non-insured and insured population. The way we construct these rates is explained 
in detail in section V. 5 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Next section reviews previous literature 
related to health decentralization making explicit what our contributions are. The third 
section discusses briefly some characteristics of the health system in Mexico and the 
evolution of the main health indicators in the last two decades. The fourth section 
presents a description of the process of health decentralization and an analysis of how 
FASSA is allocated between states. The fifth part describes our empirical strategy 
followed by the analysis of the effects of decentralization on the infant mortality and 
fetal death rates. Finally, the paper concludes by discussing some lessons and plausible 
explanations for the (lack of) results of decentralization. 
II.Literature Review  
Previous work on health decentralization has already pointed out the pros and cons of 
health provision by local state governments (see Asfaw et al. 2007 and Robalino et al. 
2001 for a summary of these arguments). Among the advantages of decentralization 
are: a) local authorities may have access to better information on local circumstances, 
needs and preferences of citizens; b) information is used more promptly and cuts costs 
without procedures that require central authorization, thereby enabling a more flexible 
operation of local governments and; c) It can also promote transparency, accountability, 
efficiency and community´s participation.  On the other hand, decentralization may 
hinder welfare gains due to: a) diseconomies of scale; b) lack of capacity, skills and 
information of local authorities on how to implement public policies; c) Inability to 
collect own revenue to provide public goods; d) lack of interest from local elites in 
community’s needs (capture of rents if there is no transparency and accountability) and; 
e) additionally it might cause implementation and coordination problems with national 
policies across regions.  
Notwithstanding  the importance of the topic, the empirical evidence on the 
consequences of decentralization is scarce. In  particular, for the case of the health 
sector, previous literature has found that a  more decentralized health sector is 6 
 
associated with a lower infant mortality rate,
7 results that are opposite to our findings. 
Countries covered in this literature include India (Asfaw et al., 2007), Argentina (Habibi 
et al., 2001), China (Uchimura and Jütting, 2007), Canada (Jiménez Rubio, 2011), Spain 
(Cantarero and Pascual, 2008), Colombia (Soto et al., 2011) and a cross country study 
(Robalino et al., 2001).  
Nevertheless, this empirical research on the effects of decentralization has no 
yet provided compelling answers. First, it has had difficulties to find data on health 
spending by local governments. For instance, Asfaw et al. (2007), Robalino et al. (2001), 
Habibi et al. (2001), and Uchimura and Jütting (2007) use the proportion of total public 
expenditure or revenue that is spent or collected by provincial or sub-national 
governments as a measure of decentralization, even if such resources are used in 
different sectors from health. This indicator of decentralization clearly fails to deliver 
credible evidence about the real impact of decentralization in particular sectors, such as 
the health sector. It is common that countries differ in the spheres that are 
decentralized. For instance, a country may have high local fiscal autonomy in many 
spheres but health, or it may be that the only type of decentralized expenditure is 
health (see Jiménez Rubio, 2011), which may lead to an identification problem of the 
relationship between health decentralization and outcomes. Regarding this, the only 
works that tackle this issue are Jiménez Rubio (2011), Cantarero and Pascual (2008) and 
Soto et al. (2011) as they use a health specific decentralization indicator.  
An additional issue of just using the percentage of health decentralized 
resources is that the estimations don´t control for the level of health expenditure. This 
may lead to obtain biased estimates due to omitted variable issues if the share of 
subnational resources is correlated to the level of health expenditure (in this regard 
                                                        
7 Literature has shown that factors correlated to health status are total healthcare spending, lifestyle 
factors (tobacco and alcohol consumption, and diet), education, pollution and income (Joumard et al., 
2008). In addition, Berger and Messer (2011) find that the percentage of population older than 65, 
inequality and the percentage of health expenditure financed by public are also important features 
related to health. In addition, Soares (2007) finds that access to water and sanitation was really important 
for the improvement of life expectancy in Brazilian municipalities between 1970 and 2000.   7 
 
Jiménez Rubio, 2011 is an exception). In the absence of health expenditure in the 
econometric estimation, the results that find a negative relationship between 
decentralization and infant mortality rate may be capturing the effect of higher health 
expenditure (see, for instance, Joumard et al. (2008), which shows a positive effect of 
health expenditure on outcomes).
8  
Our paper solves both shortcomings using as measure of health decentralization 
the actual money spent by state governments in the health sector from transfers of the 
federal government, which represents a high portion of health expenditure for non-
insured population (around 80% between 1997 and 2003).
 
Moreover, following Jiménez Rubio (2011), we consider it is important to control 
for other types of health expenditure (private, federal and social security institutions) 
that may be also driving health outcomes. The absence of these controls could confound 
the actual effect of greater local and state government’s health expenditures. In order 
to deal with this issue the econometric estimation presented in Section V control for a 
variety of health expenditure or resources made by private and public institutions.  
Methodologically, this paper deals with the issue of reverse causality between 
infant mortality rate and decentralization, a little discussed topic in the literature. An 
advantage of this paper is that, for the case of Mexico, there is little evidence to support 
the hypothesis that the state assignment of decentralized resources is driven by health 
status, which allows us to have a clean identification strategy. 
Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, our paper distinguishes from previous 
literature as we evaluate the effects on health of a reform that decentralized health 
provision from the federal government to state government. Therefore, we directly 
explore whether health state provision had better effects than the provision made by 
the federal government before the reform. In other words, we depart from the existent 
literature on health decentralization (which explores whether the degree of 
                                                        
8 See also Mosca (2003) and Akin et al. (2005), which study the determinants of local health expenditures 
in Switzerland and Uganda, respectively.  8 
 
decentralization improves health outcomes) using a methodology that allows us to 
compare explicitly the performance of the health expenditure exercised by the federal 
government and state governments.  
III.  Mexican Health System  
i.  Health Institutions 
The Mexican public health system is highly fragmented and health is provided by several 
institutions. Each institution is different in whether they provide care for the insured or 
non-insured population. “The insured receive care for free from providers belonging to 
their social insurance institution […][The] uninsured population, although not covered 
by an insurance mechanism, can still access health care services at markedly less than 
full-cost prices in publicly financed Ministry of Health and state health facilities” (OECD, 
2005, pp. 29 and 30). Workers in the formal labor market workers and their families are 
covered by a set of social security institutions. Basically there are three types of  public 
health insurance institutions: i) Social Security Mexican Institute (IMSS by its Spanish 
acronym) provides services to 40% of the population (salaried workers of the private 
formal labor market and their families); ii) Institute of Security and Social Services for 
Government Workers (ISSSTE) covers 9% of the population (federal government workers 
and some state workers); and iii) others, which include social security systems for the 
state-owned oil company (Petróleos Mexicanos, PEMEX) workers, the Navy, the Army, 
among others, which covers around 2% of the population. These institutions are 
financed through tripartite contributions by the federal government (subsidies), the 
employer institutions and employees. Each institution has and operates its own set of 
clinics and hospitals and employs salaried doctors. The provision of health services is 
mandatory and there are no cost sharing mechanisms (OECD, 2005).
9 
                                                        
9 Since 1995, non-insured population can also obtain Social Security coverage voluntarily through various 
programs such as “Health Insurance for the Family” (for self-employed individuals and employees in the 
informal sector) and Voluntary Incorporation to the Ordinary Regime (aimed for small businesses or 
independent workers, like family businesses, artisans, domestic workers, etc.).  9 
 
The responsibility to provide health care coverage to those who do not have 
access to the social security system (less than half of the population) is shared by the 
MofH and the state health services. The rates charged (for those not registered at the 
Popular Insurance, see below) for health services depend on the income of the patient 
and varies among hospitals and states. The benefits include the provision of primary, 
secondary and tertiary care
10, as well as preventive and curative services, but services 
are subject to the availability of resources. Besides the rates charged (a tiny portion of 
the non-insured expenditure) financing comes from the federal budget (Ramo 12
11 and 
FASSA) and states’ own resources (Participaciones
12 and other own state income).  
In order to improve the access of non-insured and poor people to basic health 
services numerous programs have been implemented. The first of such programs is 
IMSS-Oportunidades,  which is operated by IMSS but is financed through budget 
allocations from the federal government. It is targeted to marginalized groups of rural 
areas with no access to any kind of services and it operates in 17 states (out of 31 states 
plus the Federal District). It provides outpatient and inpatient cares
13 and medicines. 
The program has its own IMSS-Oportunidades facilities and every member of the 
community where it has presence is eligible for this program. In 1996, the federal 
government (with joint resources from the World Bank) established the Coverage 
Extension Program (PAC by its Spanish acronym) to provide access to a basic package of 
                                                        
10 Primary care refers to medical services offered by primary care provider who have the first contact with 
the patient. Treatments of illnesses or preventive care are given at this level. Secondary care is provided 
by medical specialists and their patients are referred by primary specialists. They provide specific 
expertise and procedures. Finally, tertiary care is provided by specialized hospitals (e.g. oncology, 
neonatology, nutrition, trauma, etc.) equipped with diagnostic and treatment facilities that usually are not 
available in other clinics or hospitals.       
11  Ramo 12 is the federal budget  assigned  to the provision of health services  for  the non-insured 
population. It includes the MofH budget, the health component of Oportunidades  (an anti-poverty 
program based on conditional cash transfers), resources for public health programs and some resources 
for the Seguro Popular, the National Health Institutes and other large hospitals run by the federal 
government. IMSS-Oportunidades was previously financed through Ramo 12 but these resources were 
directly transferred to the IMSS budget.  
12Participaciones are non-earmarked funds transferred from the federal government to states and local 
governments.  
13 A basic distinction is that inpatient care requires that patient is admitted to a hospital overnight for a 
longer treatment. If a  patient receives treatment but is not admitted to a facility it is considered 
outpatient care.  10 
 
13 interventions for rural, indigenous and highly marginalized population. Since 1993 
the resources of PAC were transferred to the states as part of their federal allocations. 
Oportunidades (different from IMSS-Oportunidades) is another income support 
program that contributes to improve access to health. It is administered by the federal 
Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL) which aims to increase the human capital of 
the extremely poor focusing on three components: education, nutrition and health. This 
former element includes free access to the same basic package interventions as PAC in 
IMSS-Oportunidades and State Health Services facilities (OECD, 2005).  
Since 2004, the non-insured population can enroll in the public health insurance 
program called Popular Insurance (Seguro Popular), which is administered by the MofH. 
It is financed through tripartite contributions: i) a social quota from the federal 
government budget; ii) a federal + state contribution; and iii) contributions  from 
families, which depend on their income level. The benefits are primary, secondary and 
certain high-cost tertiary care interventions. There is no cost sharing, it is voluntary and 
the objective is to reach universal coverage. It was fully implemented in 2004.  
Finally, a minority of the population (around 3%) has private health insurance 
(half are financed by employers), which can be deduced from taxable income. There are 
two main types of private health policies: more than 97% of the private insured 
population is covered through the catastrophic medical insurance policies (gastos 
médicos mayores) for hospital expenses and various treatments for defined diagnoses; 
the remaining 3% of the private insured population has coverage through Products by 
Specialized Health Insurance Institutions (ISES), which is a “health care system that 
assumes or shares both the financial risks and delivery risks associated with providing 
comprehensive medical services to insured, usually in return for a fixed, prepaid fee” 
(OECD, 2005, p. 39). It offers full health coverage through contracting private providers.   
 
  11 
 
ii.  Health Financing: Amounts and evolution 
Mexico spent 6.4% of its GDP in health in 2009, up from 3.1% in 1990. 48% percent of 
the financing of the Mexican health system is public (up from 40% in 1990).
 14 As Figure 
1 shows, the per capita public health effort more than doubled between 1990 and 2008. 
However, total and public expenditure in health is still far below OECD countries, which, 
in average spent 8.9 percent of GDP in 2008, which is mostly financed by the public 
sector (72 percent). Actually, Mexico is the OECD country that spends the least in health 
relative to the size of the economy.
15  
Covering around half of population, social security institutions (includes only 
IMSS, ISSSTE and PEMEX) were responsible of more than 80% of the public health 
expenditure in 1993 and around two thirds in 2003 (see Table 1 and 2).
16 In 1993, Ramo 
12 represented to 13.02% of the overall public expenditure on health (0.33% of GDP)
17 
and in 2003 its participation decreased to 9.17% of total health expenditure (0.26% of 
GDP). While state governments (without FASSA)
18 had a share of around 5% of health 
public expenditure
19  in 2003, FASSA represented about  16.8% of the public health 
expenditure (0.47% of GDP). 
The growth in public health expenditure came along with a deeper penetration 
of health services in Mexico. Coverage has improved in the last years, as physicians per 
1000 people went from 1.06 in 1990 to 1.44 in 2003 and nurses per 1000 passed from 
                                                        
14 Private health expenditure is mostly (92.3%) done in the form of out-of-pocket payments. Within out-
of-pocket expenditures, only a minor fraction is due to public sector cost sharing schemes. Most of the 
out-of-pocket is spent in the private sector. Just to have a perspective, OECD countries spend around 
18.9% of the total expenditure in out-of-pocket payments, versus almost 50% in Mexico 
15 In per capital terms, Mexico´s health expenditure was of 852 PPP dollars in 2008 (only marginally above 
Turkey), which equals only one third of the OECD average (2972 PPP dollars). On the other hand, Mexico´s 
public effort in health provision is only comparable to the one made by the United States (47%).  
16 With the introduction of the Popular Insurance, social security expenditure dropped its share to 57% in 
2009. 
17 For the calculations before 1998 is noteworthy that there is no available data for state governments’ 
expenditure. 
18 Those resources come from own state resources and non-earmarked transfers from Federation to 
states.  
19 State governments made an effort equivalent to 8 per cent of the all public sector effort in 2008.  12 
 
1.55 to 1.76 between 1990 and 2003 (Table 3 and Figure 2). Medical consultations also 
showed an important increase: in 1990, there were 1195 consultations per 1000 
population; 13 years later, this indicator grew to 1726. Although these numbers show 
improvements since the last decade, Mexico still has one of the lowest health coverage 
among OECD countries.
20 
The expansion in health resources was translated into important progresses in 
health status in the last twenty years. For instance, life expectancy at birth in 2008 was 
75 years, up from 70 years old in 1990; child mortality rate went from 39 deaths per 
1000 live births (see Figure 1) in 1990 to 15.2 deaths per 1000 live births. As Table 4 
shows, most of the progresses in this ground happened during the 1990s and first years 
of the new millennium. By 2003 life expectation was already 74 years old and infant 
mortality rate was 18. Other indicators of health status have shown important 
improvements as shown in Table 4. As these data suggest, Mexico experienced great 
improvements in health but there is still some catch up to do to OECD countries.
21  
Historically, regional differences in health indicators have been important but 
the progress observed in the last years favored poor states as they have closed the gap. 
For instance, as Figure 3 shows, the state with the highest infant mortality rate in 1990 
was Chiapas with 60.72 and Federal District had the lowest (22.36). Thirteen years later, 
Guerrero had the highest infant mortality rate (25.89) and Nuevo León the lowest 
(12.44). The coefficient of variation for this variable dropped from 0.23 to 0.18 in a 13 
years span. Table 4 also shows other variables having the same trend in the period we 
study. Table 1, 2 and 3 also show that convergence has happened in terms of public 
health expenditure (as percentage of GDP  and per capita)  and health resources. 
However, the gap between the poorest and riches states is important.   
                                                        
20 According to OECD data, Mexico had 2 doctors per 1000 population in 2008 and the OECD average was 
3. In terms of nurses per 1000 population averaged almost 9 in the OECD countries; Mexico had 2.4 
nurses per 1000 population. Finally, doctor consultations per capita in Mexico were 2.8 compared to 7.1 
among OECD countries.    
21 OECD life expectancy is  79 years old and infant mortality rate is 4.6 deaths per 1000 live births. 13 
 
In spite of the recent achievements in health, Mexico still faces important 
challenges (OECD, 2005). The government has limited economic resources to deal with 
the demographic and  epidemiological  (from infectious to degenerative diseases) 
transition that will increase the demand for health care in the near future. An 
institutional reform is needed to avoid the current fragmentation of the various social 
security structures which has led to inefficient provision of health care.  Also, issues of 
resources allocation in different dimensions must be faced. This is because there are 
important inequalities in health expenditures: across states, between social security 
institutions and non-insured population, and between federal and state governments. 
Moreover, it is important to minimize the out-of-pocket expenditure and increase the 
investment in infrastructure and equipment in the sector (Gómez Dantés and Ortiz, 
2004). 
IV.  Decentralization and FASSA  
i.  Evolution of Health Decentralization in Mexico 
In the last three decades, Mexico undertook two processes of health decentralization 
mainly for the coverage of non-insured population. The first wave happened in the 
1980s but it was not generalized since only 14 states
22 signed the agreement with the 
federal government. Although the program included the transfer of responsibilities to 
states for the operation of some hospitals and administrative tasks and the integration 
of the services provided by IMSS-Coplamar
23 and the MofH, the spending decisions, 
regulation and policy formulation remained controlled by the MofH (see Cabrero and 
Martínez Vázquez, 2000 and Merino, 2003). Moreover, the provision of health services 
and health outcomes from this attempt of decentralization were not different between 
                                                        
22  Tlaxcala, Nuevo León, Guerrero, Jalisco, Baja California Sur, Morelos, Tabasco, Querétaro, Sonora, 
Colima, Estado de México, Guanajuato, Aguascalientes and Quintana Roo. Note that, on average, these 
states are more industrialized, have less population dispersions, and problems of nutrition, health and 
education.  
23  COPLAMAR stands for “Coordinación General del Plan Nacional de Zonas Deprimidas y Grupos 
Marginados”, one of the social programs implemented in the seventies.  14 
 
the signers and non-signers of the health decentralization agreement of the 80´s(Birn, 
1999).  
After some minor decentralizing actions during the administration of President 
Salinas (1988-1994) (see Merino, 2003), a comprehensive decentralization reform was 
launched in 1996 as part of an important strategy of the Health Sector Reform Program 
1995-2000. Centralism in the sector was seen as a cause of several problems such as low 
efficiency in the allocation of resources; lack of clarity in the responsibilities of each tier 
of government, excessive bureaucracy, inertia and inequality in the distribution of 
resources among states and absence of coordination between IMSS-Solidaridad,
24 MofH 
and state health authorities (Merino, 2003). In order to tackle these issues, the reform 
defined clearly the health concurrence of federal and state governments,
25  and the 
federal government transferred operative functions, along with health human, physical 
and economic resources to states, thereby providing them with greater autonomy. 
Former  employees  of the federal MofH became  part of the state administration. 
Although the reform of the 1990s was deeper than the one implemented in the 1980s, 
Merino (2003) argues that the implementation of health decentralization was uniform 
across states without taking into account differences in administrative capacity, 
willingness to take the transfer of responsibilities or states characteristics of population, 
services and geography, among others.               
In order to meet their new responsibilities, states were endowed with FASSA, a 
fund that was created along with others in the context of a federalist reform in 1997. 
FASSA is a fund that transfers federal resources to states for health provision; it must be 
spent exclusively on health services for the non-insured population. FASSA represents 
the main source of financing for states as 77% and 64% of the state´s health expenditure 
                                                        




th of the Health Law establish the responsibilities of both levels of governments. 
In short, states are in charge of the organization and operation of health establishments and services, 
prevention of contagious diseases, maternity child care, nutrition, visual and  auditive  health, among 
others. Federation, in turn, operates most of the secondary and tertiary hospitals, designs  health 
regulation and policies, watches the use of economic resources, deals with labor relations of the non-
insured system, and takes mayor investment decisions.   15 
 
came from this federal fund in 1998 and  2009, respectively.
26  Although FASSA is 
distributed among states according to criteria such as health infrastructure, health 
service workers, the budget assigned the previous year and a component that is aimed 
to equalize health accessibility,
27 the law does not set the weight of each component 
neither the total amount allocated to the fund. Hence, the law does not establish a clear 
criterion for its distribution, allowing discretionary decisions  by legislators and the 
federal government. Further, the resources obtained by every state are based on the 
amount agreed on originally between the federal government and states (Ortega, 2004), 
which depended on the expenditure made by the Ministry of Health before 
decentralization (Merino, 2003).  
In fact, FASSA allocation between states in its first year of operation (1998) was 
very similar to the allocation of the MofH budget in 1997 and during the first years of 
the reform, federal expenditure to states was reduced considerably (see Figure 4 and 
Figure 5). In 1997 MofH distributed resources to states equivalent to 0.34% of GDP 
while in 1998 the number dropped to 0.02% with 14 states not receiving any resources. 
FASSA budget in 1998 was equal to 0.39% of GDP. As shown in subsequent sections that 
the MofH budget for each state in 1997 is a good predictor of FASSA in any given year, 
suggesting that the fund has a strong inertial component.
28   
ii.  What explains FASSA allocation among states? 
In this section we provide some empirical evidence about the determinants of non-
insured expenditure allocation among states (Ramo 12 before 1998 and FASSA after 
                                                        
26 Merino (2003) considers that the high dependence of states on transfers is not optimal for health 
provision as they have little flexibility to make adjustments to respond to their needs. Moreover, states 
may limit their health expenditures if they believe that a higher effort would be seen as a lower need for 
resources and thus less transfers from the federal government. .   
27 This component receives the remaining of the total budget of FASSA, which represents a low share. For 
instance, in 2001 its allocation was of only 100 million pesos when the overall FASSA budget was around 
25,000 million pesos.  The distribution of the equalitarian component among states has a formula 
established in the Law and depends on non-insured population, mortality, marginalization and federal 
budget (article 31 of the Fiscal Coordination Law). This is the only formula for FASSA in the Law.   
28 After 2004, the nature of FASSA changed because it was used by the federal government to finance the 
operation of the Popular Insurance under different expenditure rules. For this reason the analysis of this 
paper stops in that year.  16 
 
1997).  First, we will present the descriptive statistics of this exercise and then we 
proceed to the description of the empirical strategy and its results.  
Descriptive statistics 
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for the two set of regressions: Ramo 12 (1993-
1997) and FASSA (1998-2003) in per capita terms. We use lagged covariates by one year 
because health budget is allocated by the end of the previous year when legislators 
approve the federal budget.  
The dependent variables, Ramo 12 and FASSA are on average 279 and 438 pesos 
per person, respectively (see Table 5). The potential explanatory variables for the non-
insured population are some proxies for health needs, resources and socioeconomic 
variables. First, we include the infant mortality rate (the sample average is of 27.6 and 
19.6 deaths of children younger than 1 year per 1000 live births in the pre and post 
reform years) and the infectious and parasitic mortality rate (0.25 and 0.2 deaths per 
1000 inhabitants, respectively).
29  Second, according the Law of Fiscal Coordination, 
FASSA allocation should be partly determined by the physical and medical infrastructure 
available in each state. In order to control for these elements, we include total number 
of doctors assigned for non-insured population in each state (1.36 and 1.41 doctors per 
one thousand non-insured individuals before and after 1998).
30 Third, we also include 
socioeconomic variables such as the annual gross state product per capita (66.1 and 
76.4 thousands of pesos as of December of 2010); the ratio of the non-insured 
                                                        
29 During the process of collecting the data, we also collected other variables like deaths by maternal 
causes, fetal deaths, deaths by conditions originated in the perinatal period, deaths by diabetes, and 
deaths by nutritional deficiencies, among others. We do not include these variables as regressors because 
many of them are highly correlated. However, the results are robust to the use of one specific variable 
instead of another. 
30 We also try other specifications including the number of non-insured medical offices and appointments; 
number of dentists, number of nurses and number of hospital beds of the Ministry of Health. As before, 
we do not include these variables as regressors because many of them are highly correlated. However, 
the results are robust to the inclusion of one of these variables instead of the one included in the 
specification. 17 
 
population over the total population (47 and 50%), and total population (2.9 and 3.1 
millions).
31 
Finally, according to the Law of Fiscal Coordination, the allocation of FASSA also 
depends on what each state received in the previous year. In fact, when the 
FASSA started to operate, the allocation of such resources among states crucially 
depended on what the federal government directly spent on each state in 1997 through 
centralized resources, i.e.,  Ramo 12. This means that as of today, the allocation of 
FASSA between states still depends on what each state received in 1997 from Ramo 12. 
For this reason, we add as a regressor the amount of resources that each state received 
in 1997 through Ramo 12. On average this variable is 311 pesos per capita. Following 
the same logic in Ramo 12 per capita regressions, we include Ramo12 per capita in 1992 
(the state average of this variable was of 254 pesos per capita).  
Health Expenditure 1993-2003 
Our empirical strategy in this section intends to explore what the determinants are for 
the distribution of non-insured health expenditure among states: Ramo 12 for the 
previous years of the reform of 1997 and FASSA for the 1998-2003 period in order to 
check if there was a change in the criteria of assignation once the decentralization took 
place.  
For each period (before and after 1997), we run two sets of regressions. The first 
one is a pooled data approach, in which we regress per capita FASSA (and Ramo 12) 
flows received by state 𝑖  in  year  𝑡  in constant pesos, on a set of covariates that 
presumably determines the amount of resources that each state receives in a specific 
year. We include year dummies to the specification to control for aggregate time 
effects. In this estimation, we add a time-invariant regressor: the federal budget on 
health in 1997  (in 1992 for Ramo 12 specifications)  because we want to see how 
important this inertial component is for FASSA allocation, as some authors have 
                                                        
31 Education was also included in some specifications but the results were unaltered.  18 
 
suggested. We also include a state fixed effects estimations (removing the Ramo 12 per 
capita  component) in order to check whether the estimations are consistent. The 
second set of estimations are cross section regressions for 1998 and 2003 (results are 
consistent for the rest of the years) as we are interested to see the year basis criteria of 
the Federal Congress in the assignment of FASSA.  
We also run a similar set of regressions for the Ramo 12 per capita before the 
reform (between 1993 and 1997). The justification is that Ramo 12 in 1997 is a powerful 
determinant of FASSA allocation in the following years. So, we want to understand if 
Ramo 12 per capita is correlated to other variables that indirectly could be determining 
FASSA.  
Results 
The results for the determinants of FASSA and Ramo 12 per capita are shown in Table 6. 
For columns (1) and (7), which only include year dummies and our workhorse set of 
controls, the interpretation of the coefficients is as follows. For every 1000 pesos per 
capita states received in transfers under Ramo 12 in 1997 (1992), it gets under FASSA 
(still Ramo12 in 1997) 1329 (963) pesos on average in the period 1998-2003 (1993-
1997). The effect is statistically significant at 1% level. This means that in fact whatever 
each state received in 1997 and 1992 by Ramo12 is the main determinant of the amount 
each state receive from FASSA (after 1997) and Ramo 12 (after 1997) in any given year. 
This result remains unchanged in cross section regressions as specifications 3, 5, 
9 and 11 show as the inertial component is crucial to understand the allocation of health 
public expenditure for non-insured population. Probably this  result  should not be a 
surprise because there is persistence on health outcomes and resources over time and 
the initial allocation of expenditure may be picking the effect of initial outcomes. 
However, we believe that health outcomes (such as infant mortality rate) should matter 
independently in how health expenditure is allocated. In this sense, we do not find 
consistency in the signs and significance of the different potential explanatory variables 
(even though they are explicitly contained in the formula of FASSA) across the different 19 
 
regressions. This leads us to suggest that legislators assign health budget exclusively 
taking into account the previous allocation and no other health fundamentals. The only 
variable that seems to be consistent in the significance and magnitude is population. 
The sign is negative; implying that more populous states  obtained lower health 
transfers. It could be thought that this sign is due to its correlation with other variables. 
For instance, it is plausible that a state with high mortality has restricted access to 
health facilities that are  negatively  correlated to population density. However, 
discarding population as an explanatory variable does not change our results. 
In particular, infant mortality rate and infectious and parasitic mortality rate 
yield no significant estimates in most of the cases. In few specifications they even have 
an opposite expected sign as it is negative. The result would indicate that states with 
more health need would receive fewer resources from FASSA, suggesting a regressive 
scheme of distribution of health budget.  
With respect to the variable related to medical infrastructure (number of doctors 
by the Ministry of Health per non-insured population), the coefficient is positive for 
Ramo 12 per capita but only the regressions for 1997 (columns 5 and 6) are significant. 
Interestingly, for FASSA per capita regressions without Ramo 12 per capita for 1997 
included, the results are positive and significant for the fixed effects and 2003 
regressions (columns 8 and 12), which could be related to the FASSA allocation formula 
stated in the Law of Fiscal Coordination,  
Finally,  in a few specifications, state GDP shows a negative and significant 
coefficient, indicating that there is some redistributive element in FASSA. However, this 
result is not consistent across the different specifications. It is surprising that the 
proportion of non-insured population is not significant because it is precisely the 
population that it should be targeted by non-insured expenditure (either Ramo 12 or 
FASSA).  
In sum, the results indicate that health outcomes (and other variables) do not 
determine how the resources are allocated. Our  regressions suggest that the most 20 
 
important determinant of state non-insured expenditure is the past allocation. This 
finding is critical for our empirical strategy for the consequences of decentralization, as 
we do not have any evidence that FASSA is endogenously allocated in function of health 
outcomes. So we are confident that, in particular, infant mortality rate is exogenous of 
how FASSA is determined (see Figure 6). 
V.  Does decentralization of resources for health services improve state-
level health outcomes? 
In this section we test, through different estimation procedures and 
specifications, whether the decentralization of resources for health services improve 
state-level health outcomes. First, we test whether state health outcomes improved in 
the years after the implementation of FASSA relative to how Ramo 12 did in the years 
previous the reform. This is an important comparison because the decentralization 
reform consisted of  a transfer of resources and responsibilities from the federal 
government to the state governments. We found no significant difference between the 
effectiveness of Ramo 12 and FASSA. Second, we test whether states that received more 
FASSA resources observed better health outcomes than low FASSA states after the 
reform. Again, we found no significant difference. Third, we test whether there is a 
difference between state health outcomes of the uninsured relative to the insured 
population after the implementation of the reform. Since Ramo 12 and FASSA focus on 
the non-insured population, we took the insured population as a control group. We 
found, as before, no significant difference between health improvements observed after 
the implementation of the reform among the treatment and control groups. Finally, 
focusing on expenditure amounts, we test whether the effectiveness  of FASSA and 
Ramo 12, which focus on the non-insured population,  between the years before the 
reform (1993-1997) and the years after the reform was implemented (1998-2003) is 
more effective than the health expenditure for the insured population. Contrary to all 
previous results, we found that in fact FASSA and Ramo 12 together are more effective 
than the IMSS, ISSSTE or PEMEX at reducing fetal deaths. 21 
 
i.  Summary statistics 
Before presenting the results, we briefly summarize the main variables used in 
this section. In Table 7 we show the summary statistics of the variables used by pooling 
the data from 1993 through  2003. The definition, corresponding acronym, units of 
measure and source for each of these variables is included in Table 8. We follow the 
literature using as our preferred health status variable, infant mortality rate, denoted 
IMRit (deaths of babies younger than 1 year old divided by life births). According to 
summary statistics, the natural log of 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 is on average 3.11, that is, approximately 22 
infant deaths per thousand births among all states and years. There are various reasons 
we focus on IMRit as our main dependent variable. Infant mortality rate is a good health 
outcome measure as it reflects health attention to sensitive care groups of population 
(children and pregnant women); it is also known that it responds rapidly to changes in 
the health systems (Jiménez Rubio, 2011); it is better measured than other indicators 
such as life expectancy; and is correlated with many other health indicators (Joumard et 
al., 2008; and Jiménez Rubio, 2011). The other variable we use as measure of state 
health status is total fetal death rate. As shown in Table 7, the natural log of total fetal 
deaths averages -1.470, that is, about 0.26 fetal deaths per thousand individuals. The 
main advantage of this variable relative to 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 is that we can obtain the fetal death 
rate for non-insured and insured population, respectively. According to summary 
statistics, for the non-insured population fetal death rate averages around 0.30 fetal 
deaths per thousand non-insured individuals. For insured population, there are on 
average 0.22 fetal deaths per thousand insured persons. 
Continuing with the variables summarized in Table 7,  Ramo 12it is on average 
190 pesos per capita between 1993 and 2003. The variable FASSAit averages 438 pesos 
per capita for the years after its implementation (see Table 5). Gross state product per 
capita  (𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡)  in constant pesos is on  average 71,707 pesos. Population density is 
around 266 persons per squared kilometer on average.  The average expenditure by 
IMSS, ISSSTE and Pemex is 2663 pesos per eligible person (𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡). The proportion of 22 
 
uninsured population over the total population per state is on average 0.49. The 
primary school completion rate, another measure of schooling, 𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡, is on average 85 
percent. We do not observe the out-of-pocket expenditure on health services by the 
population for years before 1998. However, on average, there are 0.29 hospital beds in 
the private sector per 1000 inhabitants (𝐻𝐵𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡).  
ii.  What was the impact on state health outcomes of FASSA relative to Ramo 12? 
In this section we test whether state health outcomes improved in the years 
after the implementation of FASSA relative to how Ramo 12 did in the years previous 
the reform. This is a way to test whether decentralizing resources from the federal to 
the state government improved the health of the population. Recall that before 1998 
the resources for health services were channeled through Ramo 12 and the federal 
government was responsible of their use in each state. After 1997, FASSA was created to 
channel those same health resources to states and now state governments are 
responsible  of the administration of such budget. The empirical specification is the 
following: 
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝗼 + 𝗽1𝐼(𝑡 > 1997) + 𝗽2(𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑜 12𝑖𝑡) + 𝗽3[𝐼(𝑡 > 1997) ∗ (𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑜 12𝑖𝑡)] +
𝗽4[𝐼(𝑡 > 1997) ∗ (𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡)] + 𝕏𝑖𝑡𝗣5 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
(1) 
𝑖 = 1…32, 𝑡 = 1,…11   
In equation (1), 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the infant mortality rate in 
state 𝑖 and year 𝑡; 𝐼(𝑡 > 1997) is an indicator function that takes value zero for the 
years before the reform was implemented and one after the reform; 𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑜 12𝑖𝑡 is the 
amount of resources per capita directly spent by the federal government for health 
services in state 𝑖 and year 𝑡; 𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡  is the amount of decentralized resources per 
capita for health services provision in state i and year t after 1997; 𝕏it refers to a vector 
of control variables which are described below; 𝑐𝑖 denotes the state fixed effect which is 
assumed to be arbitrarily correlated with the regressors; and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 denotes the 
idiosyncratic error for state 𝑖 in year 𝑡. There are 32 states in Mexico and the analysis 
covers eleven years, from 1993 through 2003.  23 
 
Notice that 𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 enters only as an interaction with the reform-years 
indicator, i.e. 𝐼(𝑡 > 1997). This is because FASSA was implemented in 1998 and thus it 
takes value zero for years before 1998. In contrast, 𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑜 12𝑖𝑡 operates both before 
and after the decentralization reform. 𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑜 12𝑖𝑡 appears by itself and as interaction 
with the reform-years indicator. Also, notice that 𝗽2 is the effect of 𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑜 12𝑖𝑡 over the 
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 in the years before the reform and 𝗽4 is the effect of FASSAit on the 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 in the 
years after the reform. Thus, our interest is in 𝗽4 − 𝗽2. We expect this difference to be 
negative. However, we also need this difference to be significant to be able to conclude 
that the decentralization improved health outcome of the population. If 𝗽4 − 𝗽2 turns 
out to be not significant, even if it has the correct sign, it implies that there is no 
significant difference between what central government was doing with the money and 
what state governments do with the same resources.  
Equation (1) also permits us to test whether the money spent on health services 
by state governments improves the well-being of the population relative to the money 
spent by the federal government for the same purpose but considering both effects in 
the years after 1997, that is, after the decentralization reform took place. In this case 
our interest is in 𝗽4 − (𝗽2 + 𝗽3).  If it this difference is negative it implies that FASSA is 
more efficient than Ramo 12. However, regardless of the sign, if 𝗽4 − (𝗽2 + 𝗽3) is not 
significant, we can only say that there is no difference between the two funds after the 
reform. 
There are other variables besides 𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 and 𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑜 12𝑖𝑡 that could explain the 
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡. For this reason, we include different control variables in the specification 
equation (𝕏𝑖𝑡). We include gross state product per capita (𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡) to control for level of 
income. We also try to control for the average distance between health facilities and the 
inhabitants by including population density (𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡) as control variable. As mentioned 
above, there are three main public institutions in charge of providing health services to 
eligible population: IMSS, ISSSTE and PEMEX. The expenditures made by these 
institutions could also be contributing to the decrease of the 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡. We added the 24 
 
expenditure made by these institutions in health services provision per insured person 
and name the variable 𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡. Another control variable we include is percentage of 
uninsured population (𝑃𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡)  in each state and in each year. This variable is a proxy of 
the necessities of health services in each state. We control for the primary school 
completion rate per state, 𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡, as a measure of schooling. Finally, we do not observe 
the out-of-pocket expenditure on health services by the population for years before 
1998 and sure these expenses could also be improving the health outcomes of the 
population. Therefore, we proxy this variable with the number of hospital beds per 1000 
inhabitants in the private health sector, i.e. 𝐻𝐵𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡. 
We estimated equation (1) by fixed-effects panel estimation method, correcting 
standard errors for cluster effects of states.  
Results from estimating equation (1) are in Table 9. The second column contains 
the estimates of the coefficients of specification (1) with fixed effects but without 
control variables.
32 Results indicate that an increase by one thousand pesos per capita in 
𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡  decreases  𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡  in 39.4% whereas an increase by the same amount in 
𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑜 12𝑖𝑡 before 1997 decreased 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 in 33.7% (and both effects are statistically 
significant at the 1% level). Recall that average 𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 is 438 pesos, thus if it increases 
to 1438, an increase of 228%, the infant mortality decreases 39.4%. For the case of 
𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑜 12𝑖𝑡, an increase from its average of 278 pesos per capita between 1993 and 
1998 to 1278 pesos, a 1000 pesos increase or a 359% increase, the infant mortality 
decreases by 33.7%. The difference between the two semi-elasticities is 𝗽4 − 𝗽2 =
 −0.394 − (0.337) = −0.057, but not statistically significant. This implies that 𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 
fares no better than 𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑜 12𝑖𝑡.  
In column (3) we estimate the same specification as before but we added control 
variables. Results are similar as those in column (2), that is, there is no significant 
                                                        
32 Results in column (1) were included to compare the 𝑅2  from equation (1) without including fixed 
effects and when including such effects.  In such case the 𝑅2 is 0.474. We also regress 𝐼𝑀𝑅 on time 
dummies only and on fixed effects only. The corresponding 𝑅2’s are 0.539 and 0.452, respectively.  25 
 
difference between how Ramo 12it did before the decentralization reform and how 
𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 did after its implementation. However, the difference is positive and equal to 
0.0129, which implies that the semi-elasticity related to 𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 is 1 percentage points 
higher than the corresponding for 𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑜 12𝑖𝑡. In column (4) and (5) we show the results 
from estimating equation (1) when we include a time trend and year indicators, 
respectively. In both cases, 𝗽4 − 𝗽2 is negative, as expected, though not statistically 
different from zero. Notice that increasing 𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑜 12𝑖𝑡  and  𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡  by 1000 pesos 
decreases the 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 by 1.8% and 6.8% respectively, but neither coefficient is statistically 
significant (column 5).  
Using the results in Table 9, we also compare 𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑜 12𝑖𝑡 and 𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 with each 
other but in the years after the reform. In other words, we test whether 𝗽4 − (𝗽2 + 𝗽3) 
is different from zero. In all five columns, except for column (4), it is the case that 
𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡  is not significantly different from 𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑜 12𝑖𝑡  after the reform was 
implemented. However, notice that such difference is negative in all five  cases. 
According to results in column (5), when we added year indicators and control variables, 
the difference is 0.064 which implies that 𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡  decreases  𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡  relative to 
𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑜 12𝑖𝑡 when comparing them after 1998.  
From Table 9 it is also possible to compare 𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑜 12𝑖𝑡 performance in the years 
after the reform with the years before the reform, coefficient 𝗽3.  This coefficient is 
positive in all four columns, but fails to be statistically significant. This implies that 
𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑜 12𝑖𝑡 is less efficient nowadays than before. In accordance to column (5), the 
coefficient is 0.014. This means that one thousand pesos increase in 𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑜 12𝑖𝑡 after 
the reform took place decreases in 1.42% the 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡  compared to the effect of 
𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑜 12𝑖𝑡 in the years before the reform took place.  
Finally, another coefficient of interest from Table 9, is the one associated to the 
decentralization reform, 𝐼(𝑡 > 1997). Notice that in all five columns this coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant at 1% level. This coefficient is capturing the fact that 26 
 
over time the 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 is decreasing between 1993-1997 and 1998-2003. The magnitude 
of the coefficient decreases when we include either a time trend or year fixed effects. 
The results presented in Table 9 are robust to different measures of health well-
being, specifically, infant mortality rate for children less than 5 years old, child deaths by  
respiratory diseases per 1000 births, child deaths by intestinal diseases per 1000 births, 
and fetal deaths by 1000 inhabitants.
33 Last column in Table 9 includes the results for 
estimation equation (1) using as the dependent variable the fetal death rate by 1000 
inhabitants and notice that results hold, 𝗽4 − 𝗽2 is negative, although significant at 10% 
level.  
iii.  What was the impact of decentralization on health outcomes in states that 
received more resources from FASSA? 
That previous results are not significant  are evidence that in general 
decentralization of responsibilities and funds from federal to state authorities regarding 
state health services provision did not significantly improve the well-being of the 
population relative to how the federal government did before the reform. Although the 
sign of the coefficients of interest are negative, their magnitudes are rather small. 
However, perhaps states that received more resources from FASSA did a better job than 
states that received fewer resources.  
In this section we follow a difference in difference approach which will enable us 
to address the following question: Did states that receive more FASSA resources get 
better health outcomes than low FASSA states after the reform? Ideally, we would like 
to have an experiment with one group of states that were treated with health 
decentralization and other set of control states that were not submitted to the 
institutional change, and compare the performance of both groups after the reform was 
implemented. However, as previously discussed, all states received FASSA funds. Thus, 
we perform a pseudo experiment. We divide the states into two groups according to 
                                                        
33 These results, not reported to save space, are available from the authors upon request. 27 
 
FASSA transfers per capita received in the first year of the reform (1998). 
34 We called 
the first group high FASSA states
35 (or treated group) and are those that are above the 
median of the 32 states.  The low FASSA states group (or control group) are the 
remaining states.  We estimate a set of difference in difference regressions with the 
following simple framework: 
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝗼 + 𝗽1(𝐻𝑖) + 𝗽2𝐼(𝑡 > 1997) + 𝗽3[𝐼(𝑡 > 1997) ∗ (𝐻𝑖)] + 𝕏𝑖𝑡𝗣4 + 𝑐𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡  (2) 
𝑖 = 1…32, 𝑡 = 1,…11   
In this specification the dependent variable refers to the natural log of the infant 
mortality rate; 𝐻𝑖𝑡 is an indicator function that takes value of one if the state 𝑖 belongs 
to the high FASSA group and zero if it belongs to the low FASSA group; 𝐼(𝑡 > 1997) is 
also an indicator function that  is zero for the years before the reform was implemented 
and one after the reform; and the variable multiplied by 𝗽3  is an interaction term 
between the previous variables.  This  is the coefficient of interest because it is the 
difference in difference effect on health of the reform on the treated states (high 
FASSA) relative to  the control group (low FASSA).  𝕏𝑖𝑡  refers to the same  vector of 
control variables as before; 𝑐𝑖 denotes the state fixed effect which is assumed to be 
arbitrarily correlated with the regressors; and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 denotes the idiosyncratic error for 
state 𝑖 in year 𝑡. Also, in some specifications we also include state fixed effects, a time 
trend common for all states, and year fixed effects, just as before.   
The interpretation of the coefficients of interest is as follows: α refers to the 
health indicator average of low FASSA group before the intervention;  𝗽1  is the 
difference in the average of the dependent variable of the high and low FASSA groups 
before 1998; and 𝗽2 is the change in the average for the control group (low FASSA) after 
                                                        
34 The range of the distribution of FASSA per capita is high as the descriptive statistics point out. The 
median of FASSA per capita in 1998 was 332 pesos of 2010 and the mean was 350 pesos, with the 
maximum value being 997 pesos and the minimum 179 pesos. The coefficient of variation (standard 
deviation/mean) is 0.48. The average FASSA per capita for the high group is 458 pesos and for the 
low group is 242 pesos.   
35 Baja California Sur, Colima, Campeche, Quintana Roo, Guerrero, Nayarit, Aguascalientes, Durango, 
Tabasco, Sonora, Tlaxcala, Tamaulipas, Yucatán, Morelos, Chiapas and Querétaro.  28 
 
the reform relative to the pre reform period. Finally, 𝗽3  captures  the difference of 
health indicator average between high and low FASSA state after the decentralization 
relative to the difference  between high and low FASSA state in the years prior  to 
decentralization.  We expect this last coefficient to be negative, but also significant. If it 
turns out to be not significant, it implies that there is no difference between the control 
and treatment group due to the decentralization. 
Before presenting our results, it is worth pointing out that our identification 
strategy requires that per capita FASSA assignment in 1998, and thus our classification 
of states according to FASSA, to be exogenous and not correlated to the error term 
conditioned  on the variables included in the right hand side of equation (2). For 
instance, if FASSA is assigned to states according to their health indicators, that is, states 
with worse health indicators receive more FASSA, and then our classification of state 
according to FASSA would not be exogenous. Table 10 shows the average of both groups 
for a variety of health indicators and other controls in 1997, the previous year to the 
reform. Last column indicates the p-value for the t-test of differences in means between 
both groups. For the shown variables, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the 
difference in means is statistically different from zero. Given the classification of the 
groups and the persistency of FASSA per capita in function of the allocation of Ramo 12 
per capita in 1997, it is not a surprise that both variables are the only ones that are 
significantly different from zero in the table at 1% level. This result suggests that the 
initial allocation of FASSA and its classification were not determined by health 
indicators, as one would expected.  
Table 11 shows the results of the estimation for equation (2) between 1993 and 
2003. The difference-in-difference coefficient (𝗽3) is negative but not significant in any 
of the regressions. Although the  direction of the coefficient indicates that states 
receiving more FASSA had lower infant mortality rate after the reform than low FASSA 
states, this coefficient is statistically not different from zero. Thus, the results suggest 
that there is no a significant difference in health indicators between the treated and 29 
 
control states after the reform relative to the years previous to the introduction of 
FASSA.  The very small  magnitude of the coefficient provides further assurance that 
decentralizing resources did not have an impact on health indicators for states which 
received more resources relative to those states who received fewer resources from 
FASSA. According to the results in column (4) which include control variables and a time 
trend, the coefficient associated to the high FASSA (𝗽1) states is negative and 
statistically significant, which implies that previous to the reform high FASSA states had 
a mortality rate 34% lower than lower FASSA state. This  suggests  that FASSA was 
assigned not accordingly to health necessities by states. Finally, 𝗽2  is significantly 
negative (-0.080) reflecting the downward trend of infant mortality in control states.   
The results presented in Table 11 are robust to different measures of health 
well-being, specifically, infant mortality rate for children less than 5 years old, child 
deaths by  respiratory diseases per 1000 births,  child deaths by intestinal diseases per 
1000 births, and fetal deaths per 1000 inhabitants. Last column in Table 11 includes the 
results for estimation equation (1) using as the dependent variable the fetal death rate 
by 1000 inhabitants and results are very similar.   
Results are also robust to excluding states around the median. For example, we 
pick only the 10 states with the highest and the 10 with the lowest FASSA and the 
results do not change (column (6) in Table 11). We also run the same specification with 
the top and bottom six FASSA states and results remain.
36  
iv.  What was the impact of decentralization on the health outcomes of the non-
insured population relative to the insured population? 
So far we have not found evidence that health  decentralization significantly 
improved the infant mortality rate, used as a proxy of the health conditions of the 
population. In this section we present two more  empirical exercises. As mentioned 
before, all the states received FASSA funds, so in that sense, all states were treated, that 
                                                        
36 Those results not shown in the paper are available upon request. 30 
 
is, all states were affected by the reform. However, recall that FASSA and Ramo 12 have 
a target population,  those who have no insurance. Thus there is a  fraction of the 
population in each state that was not affected by the reform, namely, those who had 
already health coverage. Taking advantage of this fact, we perform two exercises in 
which we consider the non-insured population as the treatment group and the insured 
population as the control group. Under this assumption, we are able to compare the 
performance of both groups for the years before (1993-1997) and after (1998-2003) the 
reform was implemented. 
To compare these groups we need to observe the infant mortality rate for each 
group. However, the official statistics do not include the IMR by insurance status, nor 
there is available data that permit us to construct the IMR for the insured and the 
uninsured population, respectively. Therefore, we rely on another health outcome: fetal 
deaths. This variable is part of Estadísticas Vitales published by INEGI. It is based on the 
information contained in Fetal Death Certificates. The main advantage of this variable is 
that it permits us to classify fetal deaths into our two groups of interest, according to 
whether the mother has insurance or not.  
On the one hand, women who reported being beneficiary of either IMSS, ISSSTE, 
PEMEX, SEDENA, SEMAR or other institution are considered as insured. On the other 
hand, women who reported not having insurance are considered as non-insured.
37  
Using these data we construct the fetal deaths rate (𝐹𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡) defined as the 
number of fetal deaths occurred in state 𝑖, for group 𝑗, in year 𝑡 as a fraction of the total 
population in state 𝑖 which belongs to group 𝑗, in year 𝑡.
38 In this case, 𝑗 is equal to 1 for 
the non-insured population and equal to 2 for the insured population. Another 
advantage of this health outcome is that, similar to IMR, it responds relatively quickly to 
improvements in health provision. Moreover, this measure continues to be closely 
                                                        
37 Those who reported insurance institution as unknown or not specified were excluded from the 
estimation. Nevertheless, as we will see in the results, classifying this group as insured or non-
insured makes no significant difference in the results.  
38 Please refer to Table 8 for its exact definition used in the estimations. 31 
 
related to maternal health, one of the responsibilities transferred to states in the 
reform.  
Nonetheless, 𝐹𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 has one important problem. It tends to be biased because 
not all fetal deaths are reported to the corresponding authorities. Therefore not all fetal 
deaths have their corresponding certificate. This problem is more evident in poor, less 
educated and more disperse states, as well as states with a high proportion of uninsured 
population and less administrative capacity to register deaths. By controlling for some of 
these variables we take care for part of this bias. However, we do not observe other 
drivers of the bias. In order to control for this bias more generally we assume that the 
difference observed between two different measures of IMR, one biased (𝐼𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑) 
and one not (which corresponds to our IMR measure used along this study), is the same 
as the bias in our FDR measure. By including this difference as a regressor, we try to 
control for the FDR bias we observe. 
In a first exercise, we analyze whether the non-insured population had greater 
improvements in health outcomes after decentralization relative to  the  insured 
population. The identification strategy behind this specification is that the health 
provision decentralization was implemented for the benefit of noninsured people, 
leaving insured people unaffected. We expect that non-insured population observed 
improvements in fetal death rate relative to the insured population after the reform.  
Our identification strategy requires that the distribution of people between the 
uninsured and insured cohorts is exogenous, i.e., that insured population is almost the 
same as non-insured population but the treatment itself. There are many reasons we 
can think of that these two groups are not similar. However, Figure  7 graphs the 
national version of 𝐹𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 per insurance eligibility group. As we would expect, insured 
population has a lower FDR than the one for non-insured population. Second, from the 
graph it is also clear that both groups had very similar trends, particularly in the years 
before the reform took place. This is perhaps enough for our difference in difference 
approach. After 1997, the insured population continued with no particular changes 32 
 
whereas the non-insured population observed a small increase in 1998 to later show a 
steady decrease along the following years. 
Another important assumption behind our identification strategy is that the 
composition of groups does not change over time, particularly as the result of 
decentralization. One problem could be that because of the decentralization, people 
would prefer to be not insured. However, the insurance status depends on whether the 
person works in the formal or informal sector. Therefore, most people do not choose 
whether to have insurance or not, but in which sector of the labor market to work. 
Moreover, in general, health services for non-insured people tend to be worse than 
health services for insured people.  
We perform a difference in difference econometric approach with fixed effects. 
The equation to regress is as follows.  
𝐹𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝗼 + 𝗽1𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝗽2𝐼(𝑡 > 1997) + 𝗽3�𝐼(𝑡 > 1997) ∗ �𝑇 𝑗�� + 𝕏𝑖𝑗𝑡𝗣4 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡  (3) 
  𝑖 = 1…32, 𝑗 = 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑡 = 1,…11 
   
In this case, 𝐹𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the natural log of the fetal death rate for state 𝑖, group 𝑗, 
in year 𝑡.  𝑇𝑖𝑗  is equal to one for  the  non-insured population in state 𝑖, and zero 
otherwise. Finally, 𝐼(𝑡 > 1997) is defined as previously. Our interest focuses on the 
coefficient that  accompanies the interaction of both previous variables,  𝗽3. This 
coefficient is the difference in difference effect of the reform on 𝐹𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 for the non-
insured population relative to the control group, that is, the insured population. We 
expect this coefficient to be negative and significant. If it is only negative, but not 
significant, we cannot say that the reform had an impact that significantly affected the 
treatment group relative to the control group. As before, 𝑐𝑖 denotes the state fixed 
effect which is assumed to be arbitrarily correlated with the regressors; and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 denotes 
the idiosyncratic error for state 𝑖 in year 𝑡.  33 
 
The vector of control variables, 𝕏𝑖𝑡, is the same as in previous exercises, except 
for two differences. First, total health from public institutions per capita, 𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡, is 
equal to FASSA and Ramo 12 expenditures for non-insured population, that is when 
𝑗 = 1, and equal to the sum of the health expenses by IMSS, ISSSTE and PEMEX for 
insured population (𝑗 = 2).
39 Second, since our dependent variable is most probably 
biased, we add 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑀𝑅) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔  (𝐼𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑) as an additional variable to control for the 
possible bias contained in the data.
40 As already mentioned, the assumption behind this 
inclusion is that the bias observed in FDR is the same as the bias observed in IMR. Our 
IMR measure does not have this problem because corresponding authorities already 
corrected the statistics from this bias.  However, such bias can be observed at the 
national level, if we compare our measure of  IMR, available at the  Millennium 
Development Goals Statistics  published by United Nations, and what we denote 
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑, published by the Bureau of Health Statistics of Mexico, SINAIS (Figure 8). It is 
clear from the graph that the 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 is indeed seriously biased.  
Results of the difference in difference regressions are shown in Table 12. The 
most important set of results are those in column (5). Columns from (1) to (4) were 
included to keep the table comparable with previous exercises. According to the results 
in column (5), which include year indicators and control variables, the coefficient 𝗽3 is 
negative (-0.0269) but it is not significant. This result suggests that average 𝐹𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 after 
the decentralization reform took place relative to previous years, is 0.026 lower for the 
treatment group relative to the control group, however, it is not statistically different 
from zero. According to the same set of results, 𝗽1 suggests that fetal deaths rate for the 
non-insured is significantly higher (0.621) than the insured population in the years 
before the reform and the coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level. Moreover, 𝗽2 
suggests that the fetal deaths rate for the insured population decreased (-0.162) after 
                                                        
39 We do not have data about health expenditure realized by other health institutions, for example, 
private institutions. Nevertheless, IMSS, ISSSTE and PEMEX provide health coverage to more than 
95% of the insured population. 
40 Results are not significantly different if we do not include this difference as control variable. 
Results are available upon request.  34 
 
the reform relative to previous years, and the coefficient is statistically significant at 5% 
level. In column (6) and (7) we run the same specification as in column (5); however, in 
column (6) we included those fetal deaths in which the insurance status was not 
specified in the insured population group, and in column (7) those fetal deaths were 
instead included in the non-insured population group. In both cases, 𝗽3 is negative and 
not significant. These columns are  included to check that omitting the  unknown or 
unspecified insurance status fetal deaths makes no difference for our results. In 
conclusion, we found no significant difference between the non-insured and the insured 
population when comparing the mean 𝐹𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡  after the reform relative to previous 
years. 
In a second exercise we continue exploiting our identification strategy and study 
whether there are differences in expenditure effectiveness for insured and non-insured 
population, respectively, after the reform was implemented relative to previous years. 
Fortunately, we are able to measure the effectiveness of the expenditure for 
each of the two groups, because we also have detailed data on health expenditures 
made by various  public health institutions.  This information is summarized in the 
variable 𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 explained above. In equation notation this is variable is: 
𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 = �
𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑜 12 + 𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡  𝑖𝑓 𝑗 = 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐼𝑀𝑆𝑆 + 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝐸 + 𝑃𝐸𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝑗 = 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
Therefore, we study whether the change in the elasticity of 𝐹𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 with respect 
to total health expenditure for the non-insured population between 1998-2003 and 
1993-1997 is different from the change in the same elasticity for the insured population. 
The equation to estimate by fixed effects is the following:  
𝐹𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝗼 + 𝗽1𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝗽2𝐼(𝑡 > 1997) 
+𝗽3�𝐼(𝑡 > 1997) ∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑗� + 𝗽4𝑙𝑜𝑔�𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡� + 𝗽5�𝑙𝑜𝑔�𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡� ∗ 𝐼(𝑡 > 1997)�
+ 𝗽6�𝑙𝑜𝑔�𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡� ∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑗� + 𝗽7�𝑙𝑜𝑔�𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡� ∗ 𝐼(𝑡 > 1997) ∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑗� + 𝕏𝑖𝑡𝗣8 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 
(4) 
𝑖 = 1…32, 𝑗 = 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑡 = 1,…11 
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Equation (4) is just an extension of equation (3) where we interact 𝑙𝑜𝑔�𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡� 
with the decentralization reform indicator, the treatment indicator and with both 
indicators together. As in previous exercise, 𝐹𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the natural log of the fetal death 
rate for state 𝑖, group 𝑗, in year 𝑡; 𝑇𝑖𝑗 is equal to one for the non-insured population in 
state 𝑖, and zero otherwise; I(t > 1997) is decentralization reform indicator; 𝑐𝑖 denotes 
the state fixed effect which is assumed to be arbitrarily correlated with the regressors; 
and  𝑢𝑖𝑡  denotes the idiosyncratic error for state 𝑖  in year 𝑡.  The  vector of control 
variables, 𝕏𝑖𝑡, is the same as in previous exercise, that is, includes all controls discussed 
before plus 𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 and log(IMR) − log  (IMRBiased). 
In this case, the coefficient of interest is  𝗽7. This coefficient compares the 
elasticity of the fetal death rate with respect to total health expenditure after the 
reform relative to years previous the reform for the non-insured population relative to 
the insured population.  We expect this coefficient to be negative and significant. In 
other words, we expect health expenditure for non-insured population to have a greater 
impact in reducing fetal death rate after the reform relative to the control group. 
Results for the difference in difference regressions are shown in Table 13. We 
again include columns (1) through (4) just to keep all tables comparable. However, the 
most important results are those in column (5). According to such results, which include 
control variables and year indicators, the coefficient 𝗽7  is negative (-0.192) and 
significant at the 10% level. It implies that the difference in elasticities from 1998-2003 
and 1993-1997 is 0.192 lower for the  non-insured population relative to insured 
population. In other words, if health expenditure increases 1% for both groups and both 
periods, the FDR exhibits a larger fall by 0.19% for the non-insured population relative to 
the insured population. Contrary to our previous results, the health expenditure for the 
non-insured population, through Ramo 12 and FASSA, is significantly more effective 
after the reform took place than the health expenditure for the insured population.  
This result can be explained by the fact that the elasticity of FDR with respect to 
THE  did not improve for the insured group from 1993-1997 to 1998-2003, that is, 36 
 
coefficient 𝗽5 is 0.0322 and it is not statistically significant. This is in accordance with the 
implicit assumption that the insured population group was not affected by the 
decentralization reform. Moreover, for the non-insured group that  same elasticity 
improved after the reform, i.e. 𝗽5 + 𝗽7, is -0.16 and it is statistically significant at 5% 
level. This is because the elasticity of FDR with respect to THE for the period 1998-2003 
is 0.02 and not significant, whereas the same elasticity for the period 1998-2003 is 0.184 
and statistically significant at 1% level (therefore, 0.18-0.02=-0.16). Although this implies 
that the reform did improve the health well-being of the population, notice that these 
elasticities are positive. In other words, increasing Ramo 12 before the reform by 1% 
increased the FDR by 0.18% and increasing Ramo12+FASSA by 1% for the years after the 
reform increased the FDR by 0.02% although we cannot distinguish this effect from zero. 
This is thus in accordance to our results from previous sections.  
Just as in the previous exercise, column (6) and (7) are the same specification 
with the only difference being related to the dependent variable: in column (6) fetal 
death certificates with insurance status not specified were classified as in the insured 
population group; and in column (7) those same fetal deaths were classified in the non-
insured population group. In both cases, 𝗽7 is negative, however, it is not significantly 
different from zero in column (6). This is accordance to the hypothesis that those fetal 
deaths with unspecified insurance status are in fact non-insured because the magnitude 
of the coefficient 𝗽7 in column (6) decreases sufficiently to become insignificant; and 
the magnitude of the same coefficient but in column (7) increases and becomes 
significant at 5% level. As before, these columns are included to check that omitting the 
unknown or unspecified insurance status fetal deaths makes no significant difference for 
our results.  
VI.  Conclusions  
The results presented in this paper suggest that health decentralization in 
Mexico did not have the desired effects on state-level health outcomes. We did not find 
strong evidence that expenditure after the reform can explain improvements in health 37 
 
indicators, such as the child mortality or the fetal death rates. In particular, we did not 
find that the effectiveness of FASSA expenditure was higher than the impact of Ramo 12 
previous to the reform. Nevertheless, our exercises also suggest that the noninsured 
population had better outcomes derived from the reform than insured population. 
These results contrasts to what the policy makers that implemented the reform 
intended as well as what the classical theory of federalism would predict.  
We believe that the results observed in Mexico may have obeyed to different 
factors that are worth exploring in future extensions of this paper. First, the reform was 
implemented from one year to the next and it is possible that states lacked the capacity 
to meet their new responsibilities immediately and neither were they able to administer 
the economic resources associated to health provision (Merino, 2003). The reforms may 
take some time in order to be effectively implemented as governments learn to operate 
and spend efficiently. A second hypothesis is that the institutional framework in which 
health was decentralized did not provide states with the incentives to provide better 
services to people. As we discussed in the text, the allocation of FASSA among states is 
rather unclear and it does not depend on the own state effort or health results. A merit-
based system, in which future FASSA allocations depend on state´s own contributions 
and the efficiency with which each state used its resources in previous years, could have 
helped to boost the impact of health expenditure. In this sense, a study of the effects of 
the Popular Insurance (which is partially financed by FASSA) would contribute for the 
discussion as the rules and uses of decentralized resources for that program are better 
defined. A third explanation is related to checks and balances that states have when 
spending public resources, the capacity of the taxpayers to know how efficiently their 
money is being spent and the availability of mechanisms for accountability. We think 
that these three potential explanations are not exclusive and certainly complement the 
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Table 1: Health Expenditures Per Capita (Thousand Pesos, 2nd Half Dec 2010=100) 
State 
Total Public Expenditure  Social Security Expenditure 1\  Expenditure Ramo 12  Expenditure FASSA  State Expenditure 
1993  2003  1993  2003  1993  2003  1998  2003  1999  2003 
Aguascalientes  1.784  2.805  1.550  1.906  0.233  0.094  0.424  0.620  0.157  0.185 
Baja California  2.431  2.430  2.216  1.994  0.216  0.088  0.278  0.346  0.016  0.003 
Baja California Sur  3.686  4.223  2.997  3.100  0.688  0.116  0.997  0.929  0.034  0.078 
Campeche  1.998  3.240  1.607  1.970  0.391  0.270  0.589  0.878  0.109  0.121 
Coahuila  2.489  2.928  2.301  2.455  0.188  0.108  0.242  0.331  0.033  0.033 
Colima  2.167  3.446  1.733  2.149  0.433  0.379  0.710  0.882  0.021  0.037 
Chiapas  0.856  1.464  0.453  0.508  0.403  0.380  0.342  0.486  0.011  0.090 
Chihuahua  2.050  2.586  1.829  1.926  0.221  0.129  0.233  0.377  0.116  0.153 
Distrito Federal  5.204  6.814  5.023  5.493  0.180  0.626  0.199  0.279  0.370  0.417 
Durango  1.673  2.526  1.274  1.644  0.399  0.240  0.395  0.617  0.005  0.025 
Guanajuato  1.034  1.697  0.918  1.149  0.116  0.146  0.211  0.305  0.049  0.097 
Guerrero  0.925  1.697  0.652  0.794  0.273  0.187  0.446  0.706  0.020  0.009 
Hidalgo  1.085  1.888  0.786  0.926  0.299  0.384  0.328  0.546  0.021  0.031 
Jalisco  1.712  2.423  1.574  1.669  0.137  0.051  0.254  0.432  0.219  0.271 
México  0.980  1.372  0.803  0.814  0.178  0.192  0.236  0.361  0.011  0.005 
Michoacán  0.862  1.503  0.623  0.855  0.239  0.207  0.237  0.382  0.011  0.059 
Morelos  1.457  2.183  1.217  1.428  0.240  0.173  0.342  0.481  0.092  0.101 
Nayarit  1.718  2.512  1.319  1.569  0.399  0.221  0.430  0.651  0.006  0.072 
Nuevo León  2.464  2.934  2.291  2.537  0.173  0.051  0.230  0.305  0.032  0.041 
Oaxaca  0.840  1.578  0.462  0.612  0.378  0.431  0.293  0.485  0.009  0.049 
Puebla  1.043  1.594  0.854  0.988  0.189  0.223  0.180  0.295  0.041  0.088 
Querétaro  1.544  2.074  1.310  1.377  0.234  0.112  0.336  0.543  0.022  0.042 
Quintana Roo  2.025  2.476  1.606  1.633  0.420  0.092  0.492  0.657  0.093  0.095 
San Luis Potosí  1.210  1.876  0.941  1.195  0.269  0.273  0.232  0.378  0.037  0.030 
Sinaloa  1.761  2.545  1.549  1.782  0.212  0.229  0.258  0.385  0.081  0.148 
Sonora  2.223  2.888  1.917  2.049  0.306  0.048  0.375  0.540  0.255  0.251 
Tabasco  1.237  3.089  0.995  1.424  0.242  0.197  0.380  0.543  0.573  0.925 
Tamaulipas  1.885  2.850  1.637  2.049  0.249  0.131  0.352  0.510  0.081  0.160 
Tlaxcala  1.116  1.792  0.858  1.017  0.258  0.130  0.360  0.573  0.021  0.072 
Veracruz  1.273  2.153  1.084  1.385  0.189  0.208  0.179  0.365  0.089  0.194 
Yucatán  2.242  2.830  1.837  2.033  0.405  0.230  0.353  0.523  0.031  0.043 
Zacatecas  1.059  2.043  0.706  1.057  0.353  0.470  0.284  0.455  0.028  0.061 
National  1.782  2.502  1.550  1.716  0.232  0.230  0.275  0.420  0.097  0.136 
Coefficient of 
variation  0.504  0.409  0.584  0.718  0.504  0.586  0.606  0.411  1.249  1.258 
Note: Bold numbers are the highest values and underlined numbers are the lowest values. 1\ Social security institutions are IMSS, ISSSTE and PEMEX. 
Source: Health Department Statistics: SINAIS. 
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Table 2: Total Health Expenditures as Percentage of GDP 
State 
Total Public Expenditure  Social Security Expenditure 1\  Expenditure Ramo 12  Expenditure FASSA  State Expenditure 
1993  2003  1993  2003  1993  2003  1998  2003  1999  2003 
Aguascalientes  2.356  2.776  2.048  1.886  0.308  0.093  0.502  0.613  0.177  0.183 
Baja California  2.614  2.192  2.382  1.799  0.232  0.079  0.272  0.312  0.015  0.002 
Baja California Sur  3.887  3.915  3.162  2.874  0.726  0.107  1.115  0.861  0.037  0.073 
Campeche  1.641  2.287  1.320  1.391  0.321  0.191  0.555  0.620  0.092  0.086 
Coahuila  2.873  2.261  2.656  1.896  0.217  0.083  0.238  0.256  0.032  0.026 
Colima  2.933  3.494  2.347  2.179  0.587  0.384  0.986  0.894  0.027  0.037 
Chiapas  2.708  3.204  1.434  1.112  1.274  0.831  1.175  1.063  0.039  0.198 
Chihuahua  2.257  2.551  2.014  1.901  0.243  0.127  0.238  0.372  0.111  0.151 
Distrito Federal  2.961  3.336  2.858  2.689  0.103  0.306  0.114  0.137  0.200  0.204 
Durango  2.889  2.971  2.199  1.933  0.689  0.283  0.651  0.725  0.008  0.030 
Guanajuato  2.135  2.107  1.895  1.427  0.240  0.181  0.414  0.379  0.094  0.120 
Guerrero  2.295  3.395  1.619  1.589  0.677  0.375  1.228  1.413  0.049  0.019 
Hidalgo  2.360  3.202  1.710  1.571  0.650  0.651  0.793  0.927  0.048  0.053 
Jalisco  2.407  2.475  2.214  1.705  0.193  0.052  0.367  0.441  0.300  0.277 
México  1.662  2.129  1.361  1.263  0.301  0.298  0.424  0.561  0.019  0.008 
Michoacán  2.268  2.504  1.640  1.425  0.628  0.345  0.615  0.636  0.025  0.098 
Morelos  2.101  2.839  1.755  1.858  0.346  0.225  0.554  0.626  0.142  0.131 
Nayarit  3.661  4.240  2.811  2.648  0.851  0.372  1.056  1.098  0.013  0.122 
Nuevo León  2.087  1.961  1.941  1.696  0.146  0.034  0.188  0.204  0.025  0.027 
Oaxaca  2.652  3.633  1.460  1.410  1.193  0.993  1.029  1.116  0.028  0.114 
Puebla  2.307  2.542  1.889  1.575  0.419  0.355  0.360  0.470  0.073  0.141 
Querétaro  2.097  1.990  1.779  1.321  0.317  0.107  0.389  0.521  0.025  0.041 
Quintana Roo  1.557  1.932  1.235  1.274  0.323  0.072  0.451  0.513  0.083  0.074 
San Luis Potosí  2.360  2.594  1.835  1.652  0.525  0.377  0.457  0.523  0.072  0.042 
Sinaloa  2.900  3.367  2.551  2.359  0.349  0.303  0.509  0.510  0.155  0.196 
Sonora  2.711  2.965  2.338  2.103  0.373  0.049  0.452  0.555  0.301  0.258 
Tabasco  2.623  5.828  2.110  2.687  0.513  0.371  0.896  1.025  1.262  1.745 
Tamaulipas  2.663  3.080  2.312  2.214  0.351  0.141  0.481  0.551  0.104  0.173 
Tlaxcala  2.987  3.283  2.296  1.863  0.690  0.238  0.980  1.050  0.054  0.132 
Veracruz  2.955  3.626  2.516  2.332  0.439  0.351  0.437  0.615  0.214  0.327 
Yucatán  4.104  3.869  3.363  2.780  0.741  0.315  0.659  0.715  0.054  0.059 
Zacatecas  2.691  3.907  1.795  2.022  0.896  0.898  0.719  0.870  0.075  0.117 
National  2.522  2.817  2.194  1.932  0.328  0.258  0.394  0.473  0.132  0.153 
Coefficient of variation  0.229  0.294  0.241  0.252  0.873  0.941  0.783  0.631  1.683  1.959 
Note: Bold numbers are the highest values and underlined numbers are the lowest values. 1\ Social security institutions are IMSS, ISSSTE and PEMEX. 
Source: Health Department Statistics: SINAIS. 
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Table 3: Physical and Medical Resources per 1000 inhabitants 
State 
Doctors  Hospital Beds  Nurses  Medical Appointments 
1990  2003  1990  2003  1990  2003  1990  2003 
Aguascalientes  1.16  1.95  0.854  0.75  1.63  2.35  1229  1706 
Baja California  5.57  1.35  0.787  0.64  8.40  1.77  1028  1357 
Baja California Sur  0.31  2.53  1.424  1.11  0.49  2.96  2205  2256 
Campeche  0.68  2.04  0.778  0.87  1.66  2.27  1252  2242 
Coahuila  1.25  1.66  1.011  0.88  2.00  2.33  1910  1875 
Colima  1.51  2.14  0.930  0.87  2.11  2.71  1900  2068 
Chiapas  0.49  0.97  0.329  0.34  0.77  1.20  593  1762 
Chihuahua  0.94  1.24  0.621  0.72  1.47  1.78  1363  1640 
Distrito Federal  2.76  2.88  2.027  1.36  4.24  3.60  1618  1771 
Durango  1.06  1.70  0.758  0.77  1.57  2.17  1280  2237 
Guanajuato  0.73  1.07  0.605  0.52  1.02  1.32  864  1380 
Guerrero  0.70  1.20  0.416  0.47  1.04  1.34  986  2017 
Hidalgo  0.84  1.21  0.751  0.44  1.14  1.38  1052  2036 
Jalisco  0.97  1.58  0.733  0.91  1.40  1.94  1166  1493 
México  0.73  0.93  0.541  0.47  0.98  1.09  929  1505 
Michoacán  0.69  1.00  0.407  0.49  0.88  0.96  947  1717 
Morelos  0.88  1.40  0.487  0.52  1.56  1.77  1332  1523 
Nayarit  1.01  1.81  0.733  0.62  1.56  2.06  1392  2194 
Nuevo León  1.15  1.47  0.885  0.77  2.11  2.02  1647  1708 
Oaxaca  0.61  1.11  0.401  0.43  0.90  1.35  794  1756 
Puebla  0.66  1.16  0.543  0.58  0.99  1.33  821  1476 
Querétaro  0.93  1.32  0.622  0.49  1.30  1.52  1092  1796 
Quintana Roo  1.13  1.37  0.640  0.52  1.56  1.54  1490  1694 
San Luis Potosí  0.75  1.18  0.492  0.57  1.13  1.62  1036  1708 
Sinaloa  0.91  1.42  0.708  0.71  1.46  1.93  1469  2216 
Sonora  1.11  1.63  0.831  0.93  1.64  2.09  1516  1622 
Tabasco  1.19  1.80  0.751  0.70  1.59  2.03  1599  2414 
Tamaulipas  1.31  1.73  0.773  0.87  1.82  2.17  1640  1854 
Tlaxcala  0.93  1.38  0.502  0.50  1.24  1.61  1256  1759 
Veracruz  0.88  1.33  0.517  0.60  1.04  1.48  1175  1714 
Yucatán  1.29  1.61  0.814  0.78  1.44  2.07  1595  2604 
Zacatecas  0.71  1.34  0.284  0.45  0.87  1.61  1206  1945 
National  1.06  1.44  0.753  0.68  1.55  1.76  1195  1727 
Coefficient of variation  0.82  0.29  0.44  0.33  0.84  0.30  0.30  0.178 
Note: Bold numbers are the highest values and underlined numbers are the lowest values.  
Source: Health Department Statistics: SINAIS.   
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Table 4: Health Indicators 
State 
Life Expectancy  Infant Mortality Rate1\  Fetal Deaths per 1000 
People  
Fetal Deaths per 1000 
People Insured Population 
Fetal Deaths per 1000 People 
Non-Insured Population 
1990  2003  1990  2003  1993  2003  1993  2003  1993  2003 
Aguascalientes  72.024  74.568  31.815  15.518  0.387  0.252  0.294  0.197  0.600  0.339 
Baja California  72.241  74.916  24.964  14.049  0.333  0.287  0.283  0.296  0.475  0.272 
Baja California Sur  73.154  75.217  30.189  14.351  0.241  0.210  0.174  0.190  0.482  0.251 
Campeche  70.135  73.910  38.898  18.702  0.254  0.122  0.180  0.124  0.339  0.120 
Coahuila  71.967  74.216  29.761  14.130  0.392  0.238  0.351  0.276  0.405  0.229 
Colima  71.468  74.550  34.552  14.763  0.272  0.214  0.278  0.201  0.260  0.238 
Chiapas  66.364  72.743  60.723  25.237  0.197  0.128  0.173  0.108  0.335  0.186 
Chihuahua  71.980  74.813  32.171  15.807  0.343  0.188  0.262  0.198  0.540  0.174 
Distrito Federal  73.727  75.167  22.360  13.420  0.442  0.412  0.334  0.315  0.783  0.548 
Durango  69.975  73.797  40.454  18.757  0.180  0.115  0.124  0.085  0.275  0.149 
Guanajuato  70.292  74.297  41.992  19.092  0.500  0.341  0.459  0.377  0.536  0.317 
Guerrero  67.294  72.498  55.674  25.887  0.056  0.084  0.063  0.050  0.053  0.095 
Hidalgo  68.623  73.703  46.964  19.668  0.374  0.226  0.299  0.210  0.416  0.234 
Jalisco  71.539  74.459  33.746  15.953  0.364  0.274  0.391  0.277  0.326  0.271 
México  71.735  74.558  32.935  16.712  0.277  0.183  0.299  0.195  0.264  0.177 
Michoacán  69.671  73.851  44.819  20.616  0.291  0.220  0.233  0.232  0.359  0.212 
Morelos  71.121  74.792  34.844  15.804  0.352  0.330  0.270  0.272  0.450  0.382 
Nayarit  70.390  74.200  41.120  17.945  0.145  0.076  0.126  0.062  0.168  0.088 
Nuevo León  72.695  74.735  24.903  12.443  0.219  0.145  0.196  0.120  0.297  0.205 
Oaxaca  66.631  72.991  54.766  23.236  0.282  0.205  0.180  0.178  0.325  0.214 
Puebla  68.528  73.726  47.832  21.108  0.494  0.336  0.522  0.268  0.477  0.366 
Querétaro  70.131  74.189  39.991  17.732  0.511  0.296  0.399  0.234  0.656  0.363 
Quintana Roo  71.024  75.052  37.987  15.364  0.337  0.231  0.274  0.197  0.431  0.273 
San Luis Potosí  69.415  74.042  43.649  18.813  0.375  0.222  0.364  0.194  0.384  0.243 
Sinaloa  70.821  73.972  36.834  16.904  0.053  0.033  0.052  0.029  0.054  0.037 
Sonora  71.784  74.395  30.061  14.755  0.206  0.182  0.163  0.132  0.334  0.272 
Tabasco  69.656  73.692  43.103  19.183  0.335  0.207  0.214  0.148  0.416  0.240 
Tamaulipas  71.374  74.263  31.397  14.525  0.222  0.133  0.196  0.110  0.269  0.166 
Tlaxcala  70.533  74.660  41.064  18.740  0.380  0.309  0.285  0.259  0.452  0.336 
Veracruz  68.686  72.972  46.672  21.416  0.276  0.190  0.244  0.158  0.300  0.208 
Yucatán  69.900  73.949  39.186  18.092  0.286  0.205  0.250  0.153  0.333  0.261 
Zacatecas  69.064  74.344  47.542  20.156  0.297  0.215  0.263  0.195  0.320  0.227 
National  70.509  74.131  39.088  18.086  0.302  0.213  0.256  0.189  0.379  0.240 
Coefficient of variation  0.025  0.009  0.232  0.183  0.041  0.033  0.043  0.034  0.062  0.041 
Note: The numbers in black represent the highest and the underlined numbers represent the lowest numbers.  
1\ United Nations estimates. Millennium Development Goals. 
Source: Health Department Statistics: SINAIS and United Nations. 







Table 5: Summary Statistics (1993-2003) 
Panel A – Ramo 12 (1993 - 1997)  Panel B – FASSA (1998 - 2003) 
Variables  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min.  Max  Variables  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min.  Max 
Ramo12 Per Capitait  278.77  116.93  100.82  724.83  FASSA Per Capita it  438.36  176.95  178.79  1034.61 
Ramo12 Per Capita i,1992  253.94  100.60  108.34  583.68  Ramo12 Per Capita i,1997  310.96  119.53  173.37  724.83 
Infant Mortality Rateit  27.51  4.89  16.59  40.87  Infant Mortality Rateit  19.56  3.97  12.44  32.86 
Deaths by Infectious and Parasitic Diseasesit  0.25  0.09  0.12  0.73  Deaths by Infectious and Parasitic Diseasesit  0.20  0.06  0.09  0.42 
Doctors for Non-Insured Populationit  1.36  1.05  0.51  10.18  Doctors for Non-Insured Populationit  1.41  0.61  0.64  3.83 
Proportion of Non-Insured Populationit  0.47  0.15  0.15  0.78  Proportion of Non-Insured populationit  0.50  0.14  0.22  0.80 
Total Populationit  2.86  2.44  0.35  12.11  Total Populationit  3.09  2.63  0.41  13.59 
Gross State Product Per Capitait  66.12  31.61  26.76  185.65  Gross State Product Per Capitait  76.36  36.35  28.46  213.92 
Total number of observations is 160 for each variable  Total number of observations is 192 for each variable 
Note: The definition and units of the variables are in Table 8.                         
 
 





Table 6: Ramo 12 and FASSA Determinants 
Panel A - (1993 - 1997)  Panel B - (1998-2003) 
Dependent Variable is Ramo 12 Per Capita  Dependent Variable is FASSA Per Capita 
   Panel Data  Cross Section     Panel Data  Cross Section 
Independent Variables 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Independent Variables 




1997  1993  1993  1997  1997  1998 to 
2003 
1998 to 
2003  1998  1998  2003  2003 
Ramo 12 Per Capita i 1992 
0.963***  --  1.083***  --  0.909***  -- 
Ramo 12 Per Capita i 1997 
1.329***  --  1.401***  --  1.279***  -- 
(0.0461)  --  (0.0582)  --  (0.122)  --  (0.111)  --  (0.0891)  --  (0.191)  -- 
Infant Mortality Rate i t-1 
0.354  -19.88  -0.571  17.87*  -2.163  11.77  Infant Mortalify Rate i t-1  -1.837  -18.11***  -3.637  8.341  7.228  13.52 
(2.638)  (12.84)  (1.810)  (8.862)  (9.687)  (7.554)     (2.585)  (5.353)  (2.185)  (11.30)  (5.234)  (15.47) 
Deaths by Infectious and 
Parasitic Diseases i t-1 
78.12  134.7  56.57  -62.07  -170.6  -419.6  Deaths by Infectious and 
Parasitic Diseases i t-1  -172.7*  252.6  73.60  -351.5  -319.6**  -639.5 
(51.00)  (136.1)  (47.42)  (158.2)  (163.2)  (258.0)     (92.49)  (211.4)  (59.97)  (314.7)  (146.1)  (413.5) 
Doctors for Non-Insured 
Population i t-1 
6.022  20.72  6.939  64.36  37.94**  89.14*  Doctors for Non-Insured 
Population i t-1  -7.265  9.011**  -13.19***  22.78  -4.810  145.8** 
(6.964)  (25.97)  (6.420)  (43.65)  (14.15)  (45.20)     (4.723)  (3.655)  (4.709)  (23.18)  (27.90)  (64.10) 
Proportion of Non-
Insured Population i t-1 
-4.082  2.082**  -37.91  -126.0  207.0  120.9  Proportion of Non-
Insured Population i t-1  -89.59  241.2  -208.7*  -310.8  -152.1  80.43 
(61.76)  (880.3)  (64.34)  (240.1)  (197.7)  (288.9)     (92.46)  (326.7)  (105.2)  (479.3)  (135.8)  (389.8) 
Total Population i t-1 
-5.171***  77.86  -3.230*  -24.71**  -5.894*  -21.49**  Total Population i t-1  -4.383*  -45.06  2.182  -34.39**  -7.270*  -30.19* 
(1.874)  (46.21)  (1.731)  (11.63)  (3.274)  (10.04)     (2.541)  (35.56)  (2.172)  (16.13)  (3.923)  (15.43) 
Gross State Product per 
Capita i t 
-0.0607  0.378  -0.540**  0.201  0.643  0.956  Gross State Product per 
Capita i t 
-1.046**  0.986  -1.179**  -0.361  -0.889  -0.329 
(0.200)  (0.763)  (0.224)  (0.875)  (0.437)  (0.926)  (0.432)  (0.630)  (0.450)  (1.684)  (0.734)  (1.752) 
Constant 
17.36  -293.3  63.33  -235.6  1.177  -71.49 
Constant 
274.0***  715.1***  184.2***  467.3  218.4*  251.2 
(66.89)  (401.1)  (52.50)  (232.8)  (158.2)  (144.4)  (61.69)  (202.3)  (49.51)  (309.4)  (117.2)  (330.9) 
Year Indicator  Yes  Yes  --  --  --  --  Year Indicator  Yes  Yes  --  --  --  -- 
Fixed Effects  No  Yes  --  --  --  --  Fixed Effects  No  Yes  --  --  --  -- 
R-squared  0.878  0.565  0.958  0.500  0.847  0.502  R-squared  0.934  0.805  0.978  0.351  0.923  0.528 
Observations  160  160  32  32  32  32  Observations  192  192  32  32  32  32 
Panel data estimations show state cluster robust standard errors in parentheses & cross section estimations show robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
 






Table 7: Summary Statistics 1993-2003 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Log(Infant Mortality Rate)  3.110  0.255  2.521  3.710 
Ramo 12 Per Capita  0.190  0.144  0.000  0.725 
Insured Health Services Expenditure Per Capita  2.663  1.030  1.173  9.384 
Hospital Beds in the Private Health Sector  0.297  0.132  0.082  0.832 
Gross State Product Per Capita  71.70  34.61  26.75  213.9 
Primary School Completion Rate  85.52  9.185  43.42  99.16 
Population Density  266.3  1003  4.780  5920 
Proportion of Non-Insured Population  0.490  0.148  0.148  0.798 
Total Health Expenditure for the Non-Insured Population  0.946  0.567  0.167  3.356 
Total Health Expenditure for the Insured Population  2.664  1.031  1.173  9.384 
Total Health Expenditure  1.805  1.196  0.167  9.384 
log(Total Health Expenditure) for the Non-Insured Population  -0.218  0.577  -1.792  1.211 
log(Total Health Expenditure) for the Insured Population  0.928  0.305  0.160  2.239 
log(Total Health Expenditure)  0.355  0.736  -1.792  2.239 
Fetal Deaths for the Non-Insured Population  0.304  0.130  0.035  0.783 
Fetal Deaths for the Insured Population  0.220  0.094  0.026  0.522 
Fetal Deaths  0.262  0.121  0.026  0.783 
log(Fetal Deaths) for the Non-Insured Population  -1.307  0.538  -3.352  -0.244 
log(Fetal Deaths) for the Insured Population  -1.634  0.547  -3.666  -0.650 
log(Fetal Deaths)  -1.470  0.566  -3.666  -0.244 
Total number of observations is 352 for all variables with the exception of total health expenditure, fetal deaths and its logarithmic function which have 704 observations. 
Note: The definition and units of the variables are in Table 8.             
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Table 8:Definition of Variables 
Variable  Definition  Units  Source 
FASSA i t  Health Services Fund for state i and year t  Thousand pesos Per Capita  Ministry of Health 
Ramo 12 i t  Federal government directly spend on health services for state i and t  Thousand pesos Per Capita  SINAIS 
THE i j t   Total health expenditure for state i, year t and group j  divided by 
population for state i, year t and group j \2 
Thousand pesos Per insured or non-insured population  Ministry of Health 
IMR i t   1\  Natural logarithm of the infant mortality rate for state i and year t  Per 1000 live births by state  UN Millennium Development Goals 
IMR Biased, i t   Natural logarithm of the infant mortality rate for state i and year t  Per 1000 live births by state  SINAIS 
IMR Ratio, i t  log(IMR i t) - log(IMR Biased, i t)  N.A.  N.A. 
FDR i j t   Natural logarithm of fetal deaths for state i, year t, and group j  divided 
by population in state i, year t, and group  j\2 
Per 100 insured or non-insured population individuals  INEGI 
DIP i t  Deaths by infectious and parasitic diseases for state i and t  Per 1000 inhabitants by state  Ministry of Health 
GSP i t  Gross State Product for state i and t  Thousand pesos Per Capita (2nd half dec 2010=100)  INEGI 
HEEP i t  Health Services Expenditure from public institutions (IMSS, 
ISSSTE,PEMEX) for state i and t 
Thousand pesos Per Capita (2nd half dec 2010=100)  Ministry of Health 
HBPS i t  Hospital Beds in the Private Health Sector for state i and t  Per 1000 inhabitants by state  SINAIS 
PUP i t  Proportion of non-insured Population for state i and t  Between zero and one  Ministry of Health 
Pop i t  Total population for state i and t  Total number of inhabitants per state  CONAPO 
PSCR i t  Percentage of students who completed primary school in 6 years for 
state i and year t 
Percentage  UN Millennium Development Goals 
DNIP i t  Doctors for non-insured population for state i and year t  Per 1000 inhabitants non-insured  SINAIS 
DP i t  Population Density for state i and t  Inhabitants per Km2  INEGI 
I(t>1997)  Is an indicator function that takes value zeros for years before the 
reform was implemented and zero after the reform. 
N.A.  N.A. 
1\ of children less than one year old. 
2\ j is insured or non-insured group. 
Sources: 
CONAPO: National Population Council. 
SINAIS: Bureau of Health Information in Mexico. 
INEGI: National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics of Mexico. 
UN: United Nations. Millennium Development Goals Statistics. 
   48 
 
Table 9: Fixed Effects Panel Estimated Coefficients 
Independent Variables 
Log Infant Mortality Rate  Log Fetal Deaths Rate 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
b1  Decentralization I(t<1997)  -0.239***  -0.228***  -0.189***  -0.0807***  -0.074***  0.0864* 
(0.047)  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.0427) 
b2  Ramo 12 i t Per Capita  0.201  -0.337***  -0.353***  -0.061  -0.018  0.123 
(0.252)  (0.096)  (0.078)  (0.052)  (0.060)  (0.304) 
b3  Ramo 12 i t Per Capita*I(t>1997)  0.0387  0.006  0.088  0.093  0.014  -0.549 
(0.324)  (0.131)  (0.126)  (0.059)  (0.065)  (0.499) 
b4  FASSA i t Per Capita*I(t>1997)  -0.177  -0.394***  -0.340***  -0.097*  -0.068  -0.129 
(0.152)  (0.055)  (0.080)  (0.050)  (0.056)  (0.203) 
  Time Trend  --  --  --  -0.047***  --  -- 
--  --  --  (0.002)  --  -- 
  Gross State Product Per Capita i t  --  --  -0.003***  -0.0005  -0.0006  0.00119 
--  --  (0.0007)  (0.0003)  (0.0004)  (0.00150) 
  Population Density i t  --  --  0.0002  0.0001  0.0003***  0.00346*** 
--  --  (0.0004)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.00124) 
  Total Health from Public Institutions Per Capita i j t  --  --  0.073***  0.036**  0.027*  0.0802* 
--  --  (0.01)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.0412) 
  Proportion of Non-Insured Population i t  --  --  -1.712***  -0.159  -0.318*  -0.894 
--  --  (0.209)  (0.147)  (0.182)  (0.710) 
  Primary School Completion Rate i t  --  --  -0.005***  0.001**  0.002**  0.00515 
--  --  (0.001)  (0.0009)  (0.0008)  (0.00498) 
  Hospital Beds in the Private Sector i t  --  --  0.061  0.069  0.055  0.0156 
--  --  (0.075)  (0.042)  (0.040)  (0.116) 
   Constant  3.243***  3.393***  4.596***  3.402***  3.012***  1.021 
(0.072)  (0.028)  (0.142)  (0.124)  (0.133)  (0.637) 
   Year Indicators  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
   Fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
   b4 - b2  -0.378  -0.056  0.012  -0.036  -0.05  -0.252 
   b4 - b2 ~ F1  3.779  0.48  0.0497  1.119  1.87  3.601 
   Prob > F1  0.061  0.494  0.825  0.298  0.181  0.0671 
   b4 - (b2 + b3)  -0.417  -0.063  -0.076  -0.13  -0.064  0.298 
   b4 - (b2 + b3) ~ F1  1.705  0.394  0.377  4.883  1.231  0.494 
   Prob > F2  0.201  0.535  0.544  0.034  0.276  0.487 
   Number of Groups     32  32  32  32  32 
   Number of Observations  352  352  352  352  352  352 
   R-squared  0.474  0.872  0.936  0.973  0.983  0.316 
   R-squared Overall     0.401  0.003  0.103  0.005  0.0869 
   R-squared Between     0.0292  0.458  0.187  0.154  0.0923 
Panel data estimations show state cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.   
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10.   






Table 10: Mean Comparison Between Low and High FASSA States 
Null Hypothesis: High FASSA  Mean – Low FASSA Mean = 0 
   Year  High FASSA Per Capita Mean  Low FASSA Per Capita Mean  P-value 
FASSA Per Capita  1998  457.66  242.18  0.00 
Ramo 12 Per Capita  1997  392.51  229.40  0.00 
Hospital Beds in the Private Health Sector Per 
Thousand Inhabitants  1998  0.21  0.29  0.04 
Population Density   a/  1997  77.46  451.10  0.30 
Log (Infant Mortality Rate)  1997  3.20  3.17  0.71 
Infant Mortality Rate  1997  24.88  24.28  0.73 
Gross State Product Per Capita  1997  65993  68259  0.85 
Primary School Completion Rate  1997  86.96  87.40  0.89 
Proportion of Non-Insured Population   1997  0.49  0.49  0.90 
Health Service Expenditure from 
IMSS,ISSSTE,PEMEX Per Insured Person  1997  2343  2330  0.97 
Number of Observations    16  16    a/  Population density of the Low FASSA group in 1997 (451.10) seems to quite bigger than the High FASSA counterpart; this difference is mainly explained because Distrito Federal belongs to 
the Low FASSA group. Alone in 1997 Distrito Federal had a population density of 5786.15 habitants per square kilometer. By excluding Distrito Federal from the Low FASSA group the new 
population density mean would be 95.43 and the new P-value would be 0.6531. 
 
 
   50 
 
Table 11: Difference in Difference Estimated Coefficients (Pseudo Experiment) 
Independent Variables 
Log Infant Mortality Rate  Log Fetal 
Deaths Rate 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) a/  (7) 
I(High FASSA group)  0.021  -0.264***  -0.573***  -0.348***  -0.407***  -0.393***  -0.275 
(0.057)  (0.007)  (0.106)  (0.047)  (0.054)  (0.065)  (0.274) 
Decentralization I(t>1997)  -0.341***  -0.341***  -0.255***  -0.080***  --  -0.066***  -- 
(0.007)  (0.008)  (0.024)  (0.012)  --  (0.017)  -- 
I(High FASSA group)*Decentralization I(t>1997)  -0.007  -0.007  -0.022  -0.003  -0.002  0.007  -0.147 
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.097) 
Gross State Product Per Capita i t  --  --  -3.875***  -0.548  -0.587  -0.864*  0.213 
--  --  (0.765)  (0.396)  (0.431)  (0.446)  (1.474) 
Total Health from Public Institutions PC i j t  --  --  0.036**  0.028**  0.023*  0.026*  0.038 
--  --  (0.018)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.044) 
Ramo 12 Per Capita i t  --  --  -0.152**  0.045  0.036  0.101**  -0.332 
--  --  (0.069)  (0.039)  (0.033)  (0.040)  (0.340) 
Primary School Completion Rate i t  --  --  -0.005***  0.002***  0.002***  0.003**  0.007 
--  --  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.006) 
Population Density i t  --  --  0.001  0.000**  0.000***  0.000  0.003*** 
--  --  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
PUP i t  --  --  -2.107***  -0.166  -0.367*  -0.316  -0.894 
--  --  (0.241)  (0.162)  (0.205)  (0.205)  (0.663) 
HBPS i t  --  --  0.019  0.076  0.048  0.153**  -0.016 
--  --  (0.088)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.059)  (0.121) 
Time Trend  --  --  --  -0.049***  --  -0.049***  -- 
--  --  --  (0.002)  --  (0.003)  -- 
Constant 
3.288***  3.448***  5.114***  3.585***  2.962***  3.621***  -4.986*** 
(0.044)  (0.004)  (0.123)  (0.120)  (0.155)  (0.136)  (0.520) 
Year Indicators  No  No  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Fixed Effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  352  352  352  352  352  220  352 
Number of Groups  32  32  32  32  32  20  32 
R-squared  0.457  0.904  0.958  0.985  0.991  0.983  0.948 
Panel data estimations show state cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
a/ Only for Top 10 and Bottom 10 FASSA states. 
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Table 12: Difference in Difference Estimated Coefficients 
Independent Variables 
Log Fetal Deaths Rate 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
                       
Non-Insured I(J=Non-Insured)  0.478***  0.478***  0.534***  0.587***  0.621***  0.512***  0.743*** 
(0.0423)  (0.0433)  (0.0952)  (0.0907)  (0.100)  (0.125)  (0.0902) 
Decentralization I(t>1997)  -0.340***  -0.227***  -0.150**  -0.0196  -0.162**  -0.213***  -0.174** 
(0.0450)  (0.0492)  (0.0602)  (0.0517)  (0.0709)  (0.0632)  (0.0647) 
Non-Insured I(J=Non-Insured)*Decentralization 
I(t>1997) 
0.0175  0.0175  0.000165  -0.0169  -0.0269  -0.0294  -0.0581 
(0.0311)  (0.0318)  (0.0452)  (0.0454)  (0.0469)  (0.0499)  (0.0439) 
Total Health from Public Institutions Per Capita i j t  --  --  0.0405  0.0795  0.104  0.148  0.104 
--  --  (0.0692)  (0.0684)  (0.0798)  (0.0971)  (0.0725) 
Primary School Completion Rate i t  --  --  -0.00494*  0.00390  0.00305  0.00331  0.00285 
--  --  (0.00269)  (0.00337)  (0.00361)  (0.00331)  (0.00332) 
Population Density i t  --  --  0.00250***  0.00251***  0.00258**  0.00253**  0.00280*** 
--  --  (0.000720)  (0.000896)  (0.000976)  (0.000927)  (0.000948) 
Hospital Beds in the Private  Sector i t  --  --  -0.0606  0.00357  -0.0354  -0.0805  -0.0847 
--  --  (0.0841)  (0.102)  (0.130)  (0.116)  (0.123) 
Gross State Product Per Capita i t  --  --  -3.72e-05**  -1.77e-06  1.59e-05  1.09e-05  1.20e-05 
--  --  (1.62e-05)  (1.43e-05)  (1.60e-05)  (1.66e-05)  (1.54e-05) 
Proportion of Non-Insured Population i t  --  --  -2.471***  -0.637  -1.281*  -1.103  -1.498** 
--  --  (0.577)  (0.652)  (0.751)  (0.716)  (0.691) 
Infant Mortality Rate Bias i t  -0.823***  0.0189  -0.115  -0.157  -0.155  -0.187*  -0.157 
(0.141)  (0.105)  (0.111)  (0.107)  (0.115)  (0.101)  (0.111) 
Trend  --  --  --  -0.0252***  --  --  -- 
--  --  --  (0.00437)  --  --  -- 
Constant  -1.172***  -1.225***  -0.00731  -1.611***  -1.588***  -1.493***  -1.491*** 
(0.0811)  (0.0565)  (0.230)  (0.397)  (0.389)  (0.351)  (0.356) 
Year Indicators  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  704  704  704  704  704  704  704 
R-squared  0.638  0.886  0.896  0.901  0.904  0.894  0.916 
Panel data estimations show state cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
 
   52 
 
Table 13: Health Expenditure Efficiency  Comparison: Estimated Coefficients 
Independent Variables  Log Fetal Deaths Rate 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
b1  Non-Insured I(J=Non-Insured)  0.510***  0.484***  0.452***  0.516***  0.538***  0.351**  0.642*** 
(0.167)  (0.133)  (0.125)  (0.125)  (0.144)  (0.163)  (0.118) 
b2  Decentralization I(t>1997)  -0.215  -0.189  -0.195**  -0.0414  -0.194*  -0.220**  -0.228** 
(0.177)  (0.127)  (0.0926)  (0.0923)  (0.102)  (0.0924)  (0.0995) 
b3  Non-Insured I(J=Non-Insured)*Decentralization I(t>1997)  -0.127  -0.114  -0.0180  -0.0623  -0.0630  -0.109  -0.0764 
(0.168)  (0.128)  (0.0822)  (0.0840)  (0.0885)  (0.0724)  (0.0877) 
b4  Total Health from Public Institutions Per Capita i j t  -0.00220  -0.104  -0.130  -0.0694  -0.0511  -0.105  -0.0780 
(0.156)  (0.137)  (0.122)  (0.125)  (0.147)  (0.169)  (0.115) 
b5  Total Health from Public Institutions Per Capita i j t * I(t>1997)  -0.123  -0.0254  0.0668  0.0287  0.0322  0.0126  0.0587 
(0.163)  (0.132)  (0.0711)  (0.0737)  (0.0788)  (0.0685)  (0.0764) 
b6  Total Health from Public Institutions Per Capita i j t * I(J=Non-Insured)  0.0637  0.269*  0.277**  0.241*  0.235*  0.339**  0.270** 
(0.155)  (0.137)  (0.121)  (0.123)  (0.134)  (0.151)  (0.110) 
b7  Total Health from Public Institutions Per Capita i j t * I(J=Non-Insured) * Decentralization I(t>1997)  -0.187  -0.231  -0.260**  -0.199*  -0.192*  -0.161  -0.235** 
(0.177)  (0.156)  (0.0987)  (0.102)  (0.102)  (0.1000)  (0.0980) 
b8  Primary School Completion Rate i t  --  --  -0.00615**  0.00214  0.00195  0.00237  0.00160 
--  --  (0.00245)  (0.00299)  (0.00332)  (0.00295)  (0.00299) 
b9  Population Density i t  --  --  0.00190***  0.00200**  0.00215**  0.00210**  0.00231** 
--  --  (0.000584)  (0.000823)  (0.000900)  (0.000842)  (0.000880) 
b10  Hospital Beds in the Private  Sector i t  --  --  0.00316  0.0562  -0.00393  -0.0420  -0.0484 
--  --  (0.0925)  (0.114)  (0.141)  (0.127)  (0.132) 
b11  Gross State Product per Capita i t  --  --  -2.64e-05*  6.32e-06  1.82e-05  1.33e-05  1.36e-05 
--  --  (1.51e-05)  (1.42e-05)  (1.54e-05)  (1.62e-05)  (1.47e-05) 
b12  Proportion of Non-Insured Population i t  --  --  -1.957***  -0.273  -0.830  -0.559  -1.039 
--  --  (0.505)  (0.548)  (0.672)  (0.619)  (0.633) 
b13  Infant Mortality Rate Bias i t  -0.826***  -0.0343  -0.127  -0.167  -0.170  -0.202*  -0.172 
(0.142)  (0.108)  (0.113)  (0.109)  (0.114)  (0.0996)  (0.110) 
   Time Trend  --  --  --  -0.0234***  --  --  -- 
--  --  --  (0.00403)  --  --  -- 
   Constant  -1.168***  -1.124***  0.0560  -1.466***  -1.467***  -1.339***  -1.324*** 
   (0.169)  (0.119)  (0.279)  (0.394)  (0.396)  (0.361)  (0.349) 
   Year Indicators  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
   Fixed Effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
   b4 + b5 + b6 + b7  -0.248  -0.0906  -0.0462  0.00152  0.0242  0.0862  0.0156 
   Prob > F1  0.000732  0.199  0.554  0.984  0.766  0.282  0.837 
   b4 + b6  0.0615  0.165  0.147  0.172  0.184  0.235  0.192 
   Prob > F2  0.373  0.00267  0.00761  1.83E-03  2.89E-03  0.0000985  0.000778 
   b5 + b7  -0.31  -0.256  -0.193  -0.17  -0.16  -0.148  -0.176 
   Prob > F3  0.0000336  2.47E-03  8.70E-03  0.0165  0.0228  0.0348  0.00915 
   b4 + b5  -0.126  -0.129  -0.0631  -0.0406  -0.0189  -0.0922  -0.0193 
   Prob > F4  0.605  0.0506  0.432  0.648  0.861  0.445  0.821 
   Number of Observations  704  704  704  704  704  704  704 
   R-squared  0.649  0.893  0.900  0.905  0.907  0.900  0.920 
Panel data estimations show state cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Note:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10. 




1/ Units expressed in 2010 pesos. 






Source: Own elaboration with data from SINAIS. 
 
















































































Figure 1: Infant Mortality Rate and Public Health Expenditure  
Per Capita 1990-2008 








































Figure 2: Physical and Medical Resources  









Note: Units expressed in 2010 pesos. 
Source: Own elaboration with data from SINAIS and the Ministry of Health. 
 




































Figure 3: Infant Mortality Rate 
Selected States  








































Figure 4: Ramo 12 & FASSA Per Capita 
National Level 
Ramo 12 Per Capita FASSA Per Capita55 
 
 
Note: Units expressed in 2010 pesos. 




1/ Units expressed in 2010 pesos. 
Source: Own elaboration with data from the Ministry of Health and UN Millennium Development Goals. 
 





































Figure 5: Ramo 12 & FASSA Per Capita 
Selected States 
Ramo 12 in 1997 FASSA in 1998 Ramo 12 in 1998







































Infant Mortality Rate in 1997 
Figure 6: Infant Mortality Rate in 1997 vs. FASSA Per Capita in 1998 56 
 
 
Note: The Insured Fetal Deaths Per Capita accounts for the Fetal Deaths of mothers who reported having some kind of medical insurance (i.e. 
IMSS, ISSSTE, PEMEX, SEDENA, SEMAR or other institutions). Whereas the Non-Insured Fetal Deaths Per Capita accounts for the Fetal 
Deaths of mothers who reported not having any kind of medical insurance. 





Note: IMR is the Infant Mortality Rate used along all the paper and it published by UN Millennium Development Goals. In the other hand, IMR 
Biased is the Infant Mortality Rate that was constructed with data from the Mexican Bureau of Health Statistics, SINAIS. 



































Figure 7: National Infant Mortality Rate 
According to Different Sources 


































































Graph 8: National Fetal Deaths Per Capita (Natural Logarithm) 
By Insurance Elegibility Group 
Insured Non-Insured